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A R T I C L E S
A Response to 
the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment
by Sarah J . Adams-Schoen, 
Deepa Badrinarayana, Cinnamon 
Carlarne, Robin Kundis Craig, 
John C . Dernbach, Keith H . Hirokawa, 
Alexandra B . Klass, Katrina Fischer 
Kuh, Stephen R . Miller, 
Jessica Owley, Shannon Roesler, 
Jonathan Rosenbloom, Inara Scott, 
and David Takacs
Summary
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 
(IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report presented signifi-
cant data and findings about climate change . But the 
IPCC’s working groups’ summaries for policymakers 
avoid making normative statements about the IPCC’s 
findings . The authors, members of the Environmental 
Law Collaborative, bridge this gap by identifying the 
normative claims that stem from the working groups’ 
summaries to spark deeper discussion and help shape 
the IPCC’s sixth assessment .
I. Introduction
On September 27, 2013, Working Group I released its 
report, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, 
which concluded, with 95% confidence, that climate 
change is occurring and humans are causing it .1 Working 
Groups II and III followed with their reports in 2014—
respectively, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability and Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of 
Climate Change . Collectively, these three reports constitute 
the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) . This Article’s 
authors used the AR5 as the text through which to exam-
ine how issues of climate change are presented and, more-
over, what is missing from that presentation . The authors 
found that not everything was fully accounted for, even in 
the three massive Working Group reports . With particu-
lar concentration on the three Working Group Summaries 
for Policymakers, the authors decided to use the AR5 as a 
springboard for discussing the relationship between envi-
ronmental science, environmental and natural resources 
law and policy, and the social issues that arise where those 
two meet .
The Summaries for Policymakers primarily focused on 
empirical claims . Each Working Group assembled facts 
about climate change and presented a compendium of the 
information gathered . To have any meaning for law and 
policy, however, the facts of the Summaries for Policymak-
ers must be refracted through a series of value claims (for 
example, “biodiversity is good” or “considering the needs 
of future generations is more important than over-consum-
ing Earth’s resources today”) to generate normative claims . 
The Summaries for Policymakers shied away from such 
normative claims .
1 . Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate 
Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis 4, 15 (2013), available at 
http://www .climatechange2013 .org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FI-
NAL .pdf [hereinafter WGI Summary for Policymakers] .
Authors’ Note: The authors collectively engaged in this project as the 
Environmental Law Collaborative. We would like to thank several 
institutions for the support needed to make this project possible, 
including the University of Idaho College of Law and the Teton 
Science School in Jackson, Wyoming. While they were unable to 
join us for the writing of essays, the Collaborative was also enriched 
by David M. Driesen and Sarah Krakoff, both of whom attended 
and contributed to the Collaborative’s second meeting. We would 
also like to thank ELI for their continual support of our efforts. The 
Environmental Law Collaborative’s first collection of essays appeared 
in ELR two years ago. [See Michael Burger et al ., Rethinking 
Sustainability to Meet the Climate Change Challenge, 43 ELR 
10342 (Apr . 2013)] . The group expanded these essays into a book-
length project. [Rethinking Sustainability to Meet the 
Climate Change Challenge (Jessica Owley & Keith Hirokawa 
eds ., forthcoming 2015)].
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Normative claims, however, are the provenance of law-
yers and law professors . How should we live our lives? How 
should laws (in general, or in a specific area) be rewrit-
ten to reflect the realities of climate change? What new 
laws should be written? How should laws be enforced or 
interpreted, given changing ecological circumstances? 
How should a changing climate prompt changes in exist-
ing systems of environmental resource governance? Who 
should have a say in implementing the law that governs 
your resource of interest?
This Article explores how the empirical claims generated 
by the IPCC should be translated into normative claims . 
The methodology used was to choose an excerpt from one 
of the Summaries for Policymakers (each excerpt is an 
empirical claim) and then write a normative response to 
that claim . The responses may serve as jumping-off points 
for deeper discussions and action by the environmental law 
community and, potentially, even as a way to conceptual-
ize the framework for the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment .
II. Finding the Energy to Mitigate
This section was authored by Cinnamon Carlarne, Profes-
sor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio 
State University.
Climate change is a massive environmental problem, but 
it is much more than that . It is also a security problem, 
a human rights problem, a trade problem, an economic 
development problem, a public health problem, and, at 
its very roots, an energy problem . We delay mitigation 
efforts in significant part because mitigating climate 
change requires making fundamental changes to our 
energy system, and our energy system rests at the cen-
ter of the dominant economic model . Change is hard . 
Yet, change is necessary . The necessity of change is high-
lighted by AR5, which states, in key part: Delaying miti-
gation efforts beyond those in place today through 2030 
is estimated to substantially increase the difficulty of the 
transition to low longer-term emissions levels and narrow 
the range of options consistent with maintaining temper-
ature change below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels 
(high confidence) .2
2 . IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change: 
Summary for Policymakers 13-14 (2014), available at http://report .
mitigation2014 .org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_
approved .pdf [hereinafter WGIII Summary for Policymakers] . The 
section continues:
Cost-effective mitigation scenarios that make it at least as likely 
as not that temperature change will remain below 2°C relative to 
pre-industrial levels (2100 concentrations between about 450 and 
500 ppm [parts per million] CO2eq [carbon dioxide equivalent]) 
are typically characterized by annual GHG emissions in 2030 of 
roughly between 30 GtCO2eq and 50 GtCO2eq . Scenarios with 
annual GHG emissions above 55 GtCO2eq in 2030 are character-
ized by substantially higher rates of emissions reductions from 2030 
to 2050; much more rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy over this 
period; a larger reliance on CDR technologies in the long-term; 
and higher transitional and long-term economic impacts . Due to 
these increased mitigation challenges, many models with annual 
2030 GHG emissions higher than 55 GtCO2eq could not produce 
scenarios reaching atmospheric concentration levels that make it as 
Yet, the only way to avoid delaying mitigation indefi-
nitely is to be as frank as possible in identifying climate 
change as sitting at the nexus between energy and envi-
ronmental law . Mitigating climate change means mak-
ing changes in the energy sector . In the United States, 
for example, in 2011, carbon dioxide (CO2) accounted 
for 84% of total U .S . greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
with 97% of those CO2 emissions attributable to energy 
use .3 Accordingly, in the United States, “the most direct 
way to reduce future climate change is to reduce emis-
sions from the energy sector by using energy more effi-
ciently and switching to lower carbon energy sources .”4 
Although the percentages vary, the relationship between 
CO2 emissions and energy use sits at the center of efforts 
to mitigate climate change across developed and develop-
ing countries .
Fundamentally, then, efforts to mitigate climate change 
require reducing GHG emissions from the energy sector . 
Yet, traditionally, questions of energy and environmental 
law have been addressed in separate forums using largely 
distinct systems of law and policy . As a result, the inter-
sections between environmental law and energy law and 
policy have been approached at the margins . At the domes-
tic level, for example, environmental regulations influence 
extraction, transportation, generation, and disposal actions 
to significantly different degrees depending on the energy 
source (for example, more for coal, less for gas, and even 
less for oil) . But most sectors of the energy industry con-
tinue to receive significant environmental exemptions . This 
fragmentation, both within the energy field and between 
the energy and environmental fields, means that energy 
decisions continue to be made largely in isolation from 
larger questions about environmental issues, including cli-
mate change .
Similarly, at the international level, international agree-
ments such as the Montreal Protocol influence production 
methods and incentivize energy efficiency . On occasion, 
the decisions of key institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) address tensions between trade, 
energy, and environmental concerns . However, as in the 
domestic context, the decisions are piecemeal, and there is 
no substantive and meaningful engagement between key 
international energy, environmental, and economic institu-
tions about ways in which to coordinate energy decisions 
with overarching global climate goals .
The disconnect between climate change and energy is 
really a disconnect between merely identifying the problem 
of climate change and actually beginning to experiment 
with pathways toward mitigating climate change . As the 
U .S . Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) Third 
National Climate Assessment concludes, making inroads 
likely as not that temperature change will remain below 2°C relative 
to pre-industrial levels .
 Id.
3 . U .S . Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), Third National 
Climate Assessment 10 (2013), available at http://nca2014 .globalchange .
gov/downloads .
4 . Id. at 64 .
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into addressing climate change “require[s] substantial 
decarbonization of the global economy by the end of this 
century, implying a fundamental transformation of the 
global energy system .”5 Almost across the board, however, 
the short-term costs of efforts to decarbonize are seen as 
dwarfing the perceived long-term benefits, as significant as 
they might be . Yet, without changes to domestic energy 
policies worldwide, global efforts to mitigate climate 
change will fail . As one of the co-chairs for AR5’s Working 
Group II recently posited, we will instead have to refocus 
our energies on managing and, ultimately, surviving cli-
mate change .6
However, to accept massive climate change as inevitable 
or to allow the costs of responding to climate change to 
accumulate exponentially would be to the detriment of 
all . In launching the AR5, IPCC chair Rajendra Pachauri 
cautioned against this approach, warning that “[t]he high 
speed mitigation train needs to leave the station very soon, 
and all of global society will have to get on board .”7 Criti-
cally, all of the mitigation pathways considered in the AR5 
involve upscaling of low-carbon energy . In essence, we 
must begin mitigating climate change immediately, and 
doing so means shifting our energy infrastructure quickly 
and dramatically .
Unfortunately, even the most-advanced economies 
are still in the early stages of thinking through how to 
achieve the types of energy shifts that the IPCC and the 
USGCRP Third National Climate Assessment suggest are 
necessary to avoid the possibility of increasingly severe cli-
mate change impacts .8 Thus, while it is increasingly clear 
that significant changes in the energy sector are necessary 
to curb climate change, it is less clear that any major state 
or regional players know how to achieve those changes 
in ways that are technologically, economically, and politi-
cally feasible .
However, reform is needed and needed fast . Mitigation 
cannot be neglected . Having conversations about mitiga-
tion means wrestling with our energy options openly and 
often . The stakes are high and we are at a critical moment 
in determining our collective future . Confronting the sim-
ilarly existential crises of nuclear warfare, Albert Camus 
famously opined: “We have nothing to lose except every-
thing . So let’s go ahead . This is the wager of our generation . 
If we are to fail, it is better, in any case, to have stood on 
5 . Id.
6 . See, e.g., Uri Fiedman & Svati Kristen Narula, The UN’s New Focus: Surviv-
ing, Not Stopping, Climate Change, Atlantic, Apr . 1, 2014 .
7 . Matt McGrath, World Must End “Dirty” Fuel Use—UN, BBC News, Apr . 
13, 2014, http://www .bbc .com/news/science-environment-27008352 .
8 . As the USGCRP’s Third Assessment emphasizes:
The principal types of national actions that could effect such chang-
es include putting a price on emissions, setting regulations and 
standards for activities that cause emissions, changing subsidy pro-
grams, and direct federal expenditures . Market-based approaches 
include cap-and-trade programs that establish markets for trading 
emissions permits, analogous to the Clean Air Act provisions for 
sulfur dioxide reductions . None of these price-based measures has 
been implemented at the national level in the U .S .
 USGCRP, Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 3, at 64 .
the side of those who choose life than on the side of those 
who are destroying .”9
Climate change is the wager of our generation . We 
can choose to do nothing and face an uncertain future, 
or we can choose to do something and begin a deliber-
ate revolution—a revolution based on optimism and the 
heroic assumption that we are capable of dealing with the 
big issues, even when those big issues involve energy and 
fundamentally changing our dominant economic model .10
III. Achieving Dramatic Reductions in 
GHG Emissions Through Sustainable 
Development
This section was authored by John C. Dernbach, Distinguished 
Professor of Law at Widener University and Co-Director of 
Widener’s Environmental Law Center.
What do we need to do to have a decent chance of pre-
venting large and growing emissions and atmospheric con-
centrations of GHGs from dangerously interfering with 
the climate system? The answer, according to the IPCC, is 
that the world needs to reduce GHG emissions by at least 
40-70% by 2050, and to zero or below by 2100 . Other 
scientific reports would say we must proceed faster . The 
IPCC also indicates that the many paths to this reduction 
should all be guided by sustainable development . That is, 
nations must find ways to reduce GHG emissions that also 
foster equitable economic and social development and pro-
mote security .
The task, then, can be succinctly stated as follows: Start-
ing now, we must rapidly reduce GHG emissions to zero or 
below, creating as much social, environmental, economic, 
and security benefit as we can, and on an equitable basis . 
The IPCC reports do not say so as directly, but that is 
among the most essential tasks of our time .
A. Mitigation
Here is one of the most important paragraphs in the entire 
three volumes of the IPCC reports . It appears in Work-
ing Group I’s Summary for Policymakers and concerns the 
physical science basis for climate change . It is also likely to 
be among the densest, most tightly packed paragraphs you 
will ever read:
Limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 
emissions alone with a probability of >33%, >50%, and 
>66% to less than 2°C since the period 1861-1880, will 
require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic 
sources to stay between 0 and about 1570 GtC (5760 
GtCO2), 0 and about 1210 GtC (4440 Gt CO2), and 0 
and about 1000 GtC (3670 GtCO2) since that period, 
respectively . These upper amounts are reduced to about 
900 GtC (3300 Gt CO2), 820 GtC (3010 GtCO2), and 
9 . Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death: Essays 246 (1960) .
10 . See Cinnamon Carlarne, Delinking International Environmental Law and 
Climate Change, __Mich . J . Envtl . & Admin . L .__ (forthcoming 2015) .
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790 GtC (2900 Gt CO2), respectively, when account-
ing for non-CO2 forcings as in RCP2.6. An amount of 
515 [445 to 585] GtC (1890 [1630 to 2150] GtCO2), was 
already emitted by 2011.11
Got it?
To unpack this, it helps to know that the objective of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) is “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would pre-
vent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”12 The Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
has translated that objective as “a likely chance of holding 
the increase in global average temperature below 2°C or 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”13 The period of 1861 to 
1880 provides a baseline for pre-industrial levels.
The paragraph specifies three different probabilities of 
holding the increase to 2°C (the higher of the two tem-
peratures). The first probability is greater than (>) one out 
of three; the second probability is greater than 50:50; and 
the third is greater than two out of three. To put these 
probabilities in perspective, it helps to recall that the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has traditionally 
regulated chemicals under its major statutes when they cre-
ate a risk of cancer of between one in 10,000 and one in 10 
million.14 Cancer risks from chemicals are different from 
the risks of climate change, of course, but the contrasting 
probabilities are striking nonetheless. Even in Russian rou-
lette, a player has only a one-in-six chance of dying.
The entire paragraph is about just one GHG—(CO2) 
(more on that later). The acronyms GtC and GtCO2 refer 
to gigatons of carbon and gigatons of CO2, respectively. 
A gigaton is one billion tons. As the last sentence states, 
approximately 515 gigatons of carbon, or 1890 gigatons of 
CO2, were already emitted by 2011.
The term “cumulative emissions” refers to all human 
(anthropogenic) emissions past, present, and future. In 
effect—and this is critical—the paragraph says there is 
an overall carbon budget (or CO2 budget) that we cannot 
exceed if we want to have a specified chance of holding the 
increase to 2°C. To have better than a one-in-three chance, 
all human CO2 emissions have to stay below 5,760 giga-
tons. For a better than 50:50 chance, the figure is 4,440 
gigatons. For a better than two-thirds chance, the number 
is even lower: 3,670 gigatons.
11. WGI Summary for Policymakers, supra note 1, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
12. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
art. 2, May 29, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 I.L.M. 849.
13. See, e.g., Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.17 (Estab-
lishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for En-
hanced Action), in Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its 
Seventeenth Session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 Decem-
ber 2011, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at Its Seventeenth Session, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2012), avail-
able at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf.
14. John D. Graham, The Legacy of One in a Million, Risk in Perspec-
tive 1-2 (1993) (Harvard Center for Risk Analysis), available at http://
www.hsph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1273/2013/06/The-Leg-
acy-of-One-in-a-Million-March-1993.pdf.
But that is not the whole story, because CO2 is not the 
only GHG. When the effect of other GHGs (for example, 
methane, nitrous oxide, and certain industrial chemicals) 
is taken into account, the numbers become even lower: 
3,300 gigatons of CO2 (better than one in three), 3,010 
gigatons (better than 50:50), and 2,900 gigatons (better 
than two out of three).
Subtracting what was already emitted in 2011 (a calcu-
lation not made in the paragraph), we are left with the fol-
lowing: The world cannot emit more than 1,410 additional 
gigatons of CO2 (one-in-three chance of not exceeding 
2°C), 1,120 additional gigatons (50:50 chance), or 1,010 
additional gigatons (two-in-three chance).
That is essentially what the dense paragraph above says.
Working Group III’s Summary for Policymakers 
explains both the scale of cuts, and how much time is avail-
able, if we are to have a “likely” (two-in-three) chance of 
not exceeding 2°C. By its assessment, global GHG emis-
sions need to be 40-70% lower by 2050 and “near zero” 
gigatons of CO2 equivalent or “below” by 2100.15
Other calculations of a carbon budget provide less time 
to get emissions that low. The writers of a frequently cited 
2009 paper in Nature focus on the time period between 
2000 and 2050, not between 2000 and 2100, and calculate 
carbon budgets to avoid exceeding 2°C based on cumula-
tive emissions in the first half of this century.16 Given past 
and projected emissions, they conclude, “we would exhaust 
the CO2 emission budget by 2024, 2027 or 2039, depend-
ing on the probability accepted for exceeding 2°C (respec-
tively 20%, 25% or 50%).”17
One does not need to be a scientist or a statistician to 
judge which of these CO2 budgets gets the timing correct. 
A set of normative propositions—all discussed in various 
places throughout the IPCC reports18—are equally appli-
cable to either approach. The precautionary approach, 
intergenerational equity, intragenerational equity, human 
rights, and basic morality all suggest that we need to 
reduce GHG emissions as rapidly as possible to an ulti-
mate goal of zero or below. In fact, the parties to the 2012 
Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC agreed on the 
importance of “accelerating the reduction of global green-
house gases.”19
15. WGIII Summary for Policymakers 13, supra note 2 (footnote and em-
phasis in first sentence omitted). The term “likely” means a “66-100 %” 
chance of a particular outcome. Id. at 4, n.2.
16. Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting 
Global Warming to 2 °C, 458 Nature 1158 (2009).
17. Id. at 1159.
18. See, e.g., Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, Con-
tribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ch. 4 [hereinafter 
WGIII AR5] (2014), available at http://report.mitigation2014.org/drafts/
final-draft-postplenary/ipcc_wg3_ar5_final-draft_postplenary_chapter4.
pdf.
19. UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, Advancing the Durban Plat-
form, FCCC/CP/2012/L.13 (Dec. 8, 2012), available at http://www3.
unog.ch/dohaclimatechange/sites/default/files/FCCCCP2012L13.pdf.
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B. Accelerating Mitigation Through Sustainable 
Development
Sustainable development is a decisionmaking framework 
to foster human well-being by ensuring that develop-
ment and environment goals are achieved at the same 
time .20 A specific objective of the UNFCCC is sustain-
able development,21 and the Convention is suffused with 
sustainable development principles and language, includ-
ing precaution,22 equity,23 and, perhaps most importantly, 
integrated decisionmaking .24 In fact, the UNFCCC 
requires all countries to integrate climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation into their national development plans 
and processes .25
Sustainable development offers the only realistic 
approach to accelerating the reduction of GHG emissions, 
because it would have governments frame their legal and 
policy approach not only in terms of reducing emissions, 
but also in terms of the social, economic, security, and 
environmental benefits that they can obtain by doing so . In 
addition, according to the IPCC, articulating the equita-
ble or moral basis for sustainable development approaches 
to climate change enhances the likelihood that these 
approaches will be agreed to and implemented .26 By creat-
ing a space for new approaches to development based on 
equity that produce both climate change and non-climate 
change benefits, sustainable development provides a way 
for public and private decisionmakers in all countries to 
get past the seemingly intractable conflict between devel-
opment and climate change mitigation .
In fact, this policy space is now being filled by a vari-
ety of new or modified laws that foster renewable energy; 
energy efficiency and conservation in buildings, transpor-
tation, and industry; and distributed energy, among other 
things . As states discovered more than a decade ago, the 
co-benefits of addressing climate change—including new 
jobs; growing businesses; reduced emissions of sulfur diox-
ide, mercury, and other air pollutants; and reduced energy 
costs for businesses and the poor—produced more imme-
diate and tangible results than the GHG emission reduc-
tions that accompanied these benefits .27
Those who draft, modify, advocate, and implement laws 
relating to climate change need to look, and are already 
looking, for ways of doing so that maximize equity and 
co-benefits . Particularly but not exclusively in developed 
countries, the greater the co-benefits, the greater GHG 
emission reductions that are often politically available . The 
task, then, is to craft, adopt, and implement approaches 
to reducing GHG emissions that are not only sensible and 
20 . Id . at 11-12 .
21 . UNFCCC, supra note 12, art . 3 .4 .
22 . Id . art . 3 .3 .
23 . Id. art . 3 .1 .
24 . Id. art . 3 .4 .
25 . Id. art . 4 .1(f ) .
26 . WGIII AR5, supra note 18, ch . 4 at 4 .
27 . See John Dernbach and the Widener University Law School Seminar on 
Global Warming, Moving the Climate Debate From Models to Proposed Legis-
lation: Lessons From State Experience, 30 ELR 10933 (Nov . 2000) .
ambitious, but are also so attractive that they will over-
come all the many obstacles to change, including not only 
fossil fuel interests, but also simple inertia .
To be sure, sustainable development may not work to 
address the global problem of climate change . Govern-
ments may refuse to enter or treat seriously this new space, 
taking unsustainable approaches to mitigation or simply 
adhering to conventional development paths and fos-
sil fuels . Alternatively, runaway GHG emissions could so 
destabilize governments and societies as to make any pros-
pect for sustainability out of reach . But sustainable devel-
opment provides an internationally accepted and widely 
applied framework for reducing GHGs, and is an attractive 
approach for accelerating the reduction of GHG emissions .
IV. Climate Change, Sustainable 
Development, and the Fifth 
Assessment Report
This section was authored by Robin Kundis Craig, William 
H. Leary Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney 
College of Law.
Proponents of sustainable development should be wor-
ried by AR5 . However, they might not realize that from 
the Summaries for Policymakers . Specifically, in Working 
Group II’s Summary for Policymakers, related to climate 
change adaptation, the IPCC notes that:
Prospects for climate-resilience pathways for sustain-
able development are related fundamentally to what the 
world accomplishes with climate change mitigation (high 
confidence) . Since mitigation reduces the rate as well as 
the magnitude of warming, it also increases the time 
available for adaptation to a particular level of climate 
change, potentially by several decades . Delaying mitiga-
tion may reduce options for climate-resilient pathways in 
the future .28
On first read, this is a fairly obvious statement . Getting 
serious about climate change mitigation now will reduce 
humanity’s need to adapt to climate change in the future 
and give us more time to adapt overall . However, the last 
sentence subtly suggests that delayed mitigation efforts 
may reduce humanity’s future options, including options 
for development .
The potential loss of future options poses risks to soci-
eties and socioecological systems that should already be 
modifying how we think about development goals, even 
sustainable development goals . All human societies ulti-
mately depend on ecosystems and the goods and services 
that those ecosystems provide, but climate change directly 
threatens the current states of most of the world’s ecosys-
tems . If you change an ecosystem too much in a bad way, 
then you retard the economic and social development 
28 . IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerabil-
ity: Summary for Policymakers 28 (2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2 .
gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL .pdf [hereinafter WGII 
Summary for Policymakers] .
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(and ultimately survival) of the societies that depend on 
that ecosystem .
The climate change extremes of this new reality, such 
as the predicted disappearance of island nations as a result 
of sea-level rise,29 have been well-publicized, but not yet 
incorporated into global development goals . In part, these 
kinds of extreme—indeed, existential—threats to island 
(and also Arctic) cultures may not seem generalizable . 
They are currently generally portrayed as tragic but some-
what unusual climate change fates for particular kinds of 
human societies, with the implication that the rest of us 
will still be able to muddle along in our pursuit of continu-
ous development .
Ecological dependence, however, is more insidious than 
that . In particular, a suite of ecological changes can thor-
oughly undermine development goals in a particular society 
without completely wiping it out . The BBC News recently 
published a particularly poignant example of the human 
tragedies that can result from ecosystem decline, tracing 
how the loss of terrestrial food species and especially fresh-
water and offshore fisheries has led to increased slavery—
especially child slavery—in Burma, Cambodia, Somalia, 
and Thailand .30 Fewer fisheries and other food species 
make it highly labor-intensive to get food, promoting the 
enslavement of children and others to carry out this task .31 
At some point, in other words, a society’s dependence on a 
failing or radically changing ecosystem drastically retards, 
even reverses, economic and social development . Climate 
change is making it all the more likely that a variety of eco-
systems will experience such changes, or crash completely .
If you read past the Summary for Policymakers and 
dive deep into Chapter 20 of the IPCC’s report on 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, you learn that 
“[c]limate change poses a moderate threat to current 
sustainable development and a severe threat to future 
sustainable development .”32 Thus, although the IPCC 
still hews to sustainable development as a global goal, 
it acknowledges that climate change could substantially 
vitiate that goal . As it notes in its classically reserved tone, 
“[a]dded to other stresses such as poverty, inequality, or 
diseases, the effects of climate change will make sustain-
able development objectives such as food and livelihood 
security, poverty reduction, health, and access to clean 
water more difficult to achieve for many locations, sys-
tems, and affected populations .”33
29 . See, e.g., Climate Change: The “Greatest Threat” to the Peoples of the Pa-
cific, Island Bus ., July 31, 2014, http://www .islandsbusiness .com/news/
palau/5906/climate-change-the-greatest-threat-to-the-peoples-/ .
30 . Matt McGrath, Global Decline of Wildlife Linked to Child Slavery, BBC News, 
July 24, 2014, http://www .bbc .com/news/science-environment-28463036 .
31 . Id.
32 . Fatima Denton et al ., Chapter 20: Climate-Resilient Pathways: Adaptation, 
Mitigation, and Sustainable Development 2 (Oct . 2013), in IPCC, Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2014), Con-
tribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of 
the International Panel on Climate Change [hereinafter WGII AR5], 
ch . 20 (2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2 .gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGI-
IAR5-Chap20_FGDall .pdf .
33 . Id.
For societies that lose their homelands, food supply, or 
water supply, this statement does not go nearly far enough . 
Sustainable development goals—indeed, any development 
goals—presume that the relevant society will continue to 
have the basic ecological requisites for development: a place 
to inhabit, a source or sources of food, water that is or can 
be made potable . Climate change calls those assumptions 
into question and limits the future development options 
for current societies, particularly in conjunction with an 
ever-rising global human population .
Nor is the potential loss of development options, or 
developmental retardation, limited to developing nations . 
Europe’s remaining ecosystems cannot support the human 
population of that continent at its current levels of afflu-
ence . In 2005, the World Wildlife Fund estimated that 
Europe’s consumption footprint more than doubles its own 
biological productive capacity, and hence “Europe’s well-
being depends on ecological capacity from elsewhere .”34 
The U .S . ecological footprint is even greater . While con-
sumption patterns in Europe and the United States raise 
valid climate change issues in their own right, the point 
here is much more limited: We cannot assess the U .S . and 
European Union’s climate change vulnerability or devel-
opment futures by looking only at those nations’ capac-
ity to respond to internal climate change impacts . These 
two sets of societies are intimately dependent on the health 
of ecosystems elsewhere, and climate change impacts on 
those ecosystems potentially limit the future options of the 
United States and the EU as much as they limit the options 
of much more physically proximate societies .
The IPCC, in other words, is just beginning to wres-
tle with what climate change could truly mean for future 
human development, sustainable or otherwise . Notably, 
reduced and changing resources alter not only a particular 
society’s development options, but also its adaptive capac-
ity, potentially creating a vicious cycle of ever-diminishing 
resilience and ability to cope with climate change, let alone 
achieve economic or social progress . Clearly, as the IPCC 
does emphasize, a strong, immediate, and effective climate-
change mitigation strategy is our first-best approach to pre-
serving as many options as possible for the future . Reading 
between the lines, however, we should also be starting to 
think about what “development goals” can look like in an 
option-constrained—and in many places under many sce-
narios, severely option-limited—future .
V. Responding to Imminent Risks and 
Present Harms
This section was authored by Shannon Roesler, Professor of 
Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers regarding 
climate impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability identifies a 
34 . World Wildlife Fund, Europe 2005: The Ecological Footprint 3 
(2005), available at http://www2 .wwf .fi/wwf/www/uploads/pdf/ekolog-
inen_jalanjalki_june05 .pdf .
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number of imminent risks: Some unique and threatened 
systems, including ecosystems and cultures, are already at 
risk from climate change (high confidence) .  .  .  .
Climate-change-related risks from extreme events, such as 
heat waves, extreme precipitation, and coastal flooding, 
are already moderate (high confidence) .  .  .  .
Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater 
for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at 
all levels of development .35
These quotations come from three of the five “reasons 
for concern” identified by the IPCC in its Third Assess-
ment Report as “starting point[s] for evaluating dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system .”36 In a 
report that understandably focuses much attention on the 
heightened probability and magnitude of harm associated 
with further warming in the future, the risks identified 
in the first two quotations stand out because they already 
exist . Some communities, including coastal villages in the 
Arctic and small island states, are already facing threats to 
their very existence . In addition, the risks associated with 
extreme weather events are widespread and already here . 
When these risks are considered alongside the reality that 
they are “unevenly distributed” and “generally greater for 
disadvantaged people,” they present policy questions not 
only about long-term adaptation planning, but also about 
immediate disaster response and aid .
In cases where communities are under serious threat 
from coastal erosion and sea-ice melt, the threat is immi-
nent and the costs are steep . For example, in 2003, the 
U .S . Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported 
that coastal erosion and flooding had affected 184 of 213 
Alaska Native communities .37 In 2009, the GAO reported 
that 31 Native villages face “imminent threats” and that 12 
of the 31 villages had decided to relocate or consider partial 
or complete relocation .38 Given the rapid rate of warming 
in the Arctic, the number of villages facing an imminent 
threat is likely higher today than it was in 2009 .
These threats result in real and quantifiable current costs . 
In 2006, the U .S . Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) 
estimated the costs of relocating the Alaska Native village 
of Newtok at $80-$130 million .39 Estimates of the costs 
to relocate other villages are either comparable or much 
higher . For example, it could cost as much as $400 million 
to move the inhabitants of the village of Kivalina .40 Even 
though Alaska Native communities are generally small 
(ranging from a couple to several hundred people), they are 
located in remote areas often accessible year-round only by 
airplane, a reality that makes relocation extremely expen-
35 . WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 12 .
36 . Id.
37 . See U .S . Gov’t Accountability Office (GAO), GAO-09-551, Alaska 
Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating 
Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion 12 (2009) .
38 . Id.
39 . See id. at 29 .
40 . See Native Village of Kivalina v . ExxonMobil Corp ., 663 F . Supp . 2d 863, 
869, 39 ELR 20236 (N .D . Cal . 2009) .
sive . The costs will only grow as flooding and coastal ero-
sion pose increasing threats to homes, infrastructure, and 
the way of life in more of these communities .
Funding to relocate these villages must come from 
somewhere other than the local communities . Most Alaska 
Native villages are self-sustaining communities closely tied 
to the sea and river ecosystems where they hunt and fish for 
food . Federal funding is essential, but villages often fail to 
qualify for the disaster-mitigation programs administered 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) . 
A village may lack a FEMA-approved disaster-mitiga-
tion plan, which is a prerequisite for mitigation funding, 
and even if such a plan is in place, it does not guarantee 
funding .41 FEMA makes funding decisions based on the 
cost-effectiveness of a project, and the high costs of new 
infrastructure (in comparison to the small numbers of peo-
ple relocated) make relocation projects costly .42 In addition, 
the nature of the risk (in this case, gradual coastal erosion) 
may frustrate attempts to obtain a federal disaster decla-
ration, and serious obstacles prevent many villages from 
participating in the National Flood Insurance Program .43
In addition to the difficulty in qualifying for federal 
disaster funding, these villages also face serious challenges 
in the planning and decisionmaking phases of relocation . 
Decisions regarding relocation depend on the coordina-
tion of efforts by local, state, and federal authorities . The 
impacts of gradual coastal erosion and flooding are not 
governed by one federal or state agency .44 Federal funding 
may be administered by multiple agencies, including the 
Corps, FEMA, and the U .S . Department of Housing and 
Urban Development . Without clear structures for infor-
mation-sharing and coordination, decisionmaking is inef-
ficient at best . Indeed, the authors of the IPCC report on 
climate impacts note that “limited integration or coordina-
tion of governance” can hinder adaptation efforts .45
Given the considerable difficulties in obtaining gov-
ernmental assistance, it is not surprising that one Alaska 
Native village recently turned to the courts for relief . In 
2008, the village of Kivalina sued oil, energy, and utility 
companies in federal district court, alleging that the defen-
dants’ GHG emissions have caused global warming, which 
is, in turn, causing massive coastal erosion and increasing 
the risks of extreme weather and flooding .46 On appeal, 
the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s dismissal, concluding that under U .S . 
Supreme Court precedent, claims for damages pursuant to 
the federal common law of public nuisance are displaced 
by the Clean Air Act (CAA) .47 The majority concluded its 
opinion by acknowledging the seriousness of the problem, 
but characterizing it as one not amenable to judicial action: 
41 . See GAO, Alaska Native Villages, supra note 37, at 22 .
42 . See id. at 22-23 .
43 . See id. at 23-24 .
44 . See id. at 36 .
45 . WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 26 .
46 . Kivalina, 663 F . Supp . 2d 863 .
47 . Native Village of Kivalina v . ExxonMobil Corp ., 696 F .3d 849, 858, 42 
ELR 20195 (9th Cir . 2012) . The Clean Air Act is codified at 42 U .S .C . 
§§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618 .
Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
45 ELR 10034 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 1-2015
“Our conclusion obviously does not aid Kivalina, which 
itself is being displaced by the rising sea . But the solution to 
Kivalina’s dire circumstance must rest in the hands of the 
legislative and executive branches of government, not the 
federal common law .”48
Of course, given the interests involved, a complete polit-
ical solution to Kivalina’s “dire circumstance” is unlikely . 
Congress is not likely to appropriate the millions of dollars 
required to relocate the village . But perhaps more modest 
goals are within reach . A combination of legislative and 
executive actions could address coordination problems, 
making the administration of available funds more effi-
cient and effective . Revision of current disaster-assistance 
laws and policies may remove some obstacles that villages 
face when applying for federal assistance .
Furthermore, although any response to the problem is 
likely to be a political one, civil litigation may nevertheless 
have a role to play . Plaintiffs will have difficulty establish-
ing the required legal elements, including the causal link 
between climate-related harms and the conduct (GHG 
emissions) of specific defendants . But as social movement 
activists and scholars have long recognized, even unsuc-
cessful lawsuits can serve important functions . They often 
capture media and public attention and provide a means 
by which to communicate grievances to the larger political 
society and to shape the discussion of critical issues .
In fact, Kivalina’s lawsuit may have had such an effect . 
The village’s story is often recounted in news articles and 
scholarly commentary, and in many cases, the focus is on 
governmental accountability, rather than private liability . 
For example, one news account quotes a Kivalina Council 
leader’s description of the problem as one of political injus-
tice: “‘The U .S . government imposed this Western lifestyle 
on us, gave us their burdens and now they expect us to pick 
everything up and move it ourselves . What kind of govern-
ment does that?’”49 As the Ninth Circuit opinion suggests, 
this is a question best addressed to the political branches 
of government, ideally acting in response to shared com-
mitments in the larger political society . The lawsuit may 
have helped educate the public and even played a role in 
framing the relevant questions; perhaps future litigation 
can help ensure that we keep the conversation going and 
identify solutions sooner rather than later . The threats to 
these communities are not theoretical or distant; they are 
already here .
VI. Security Regained, Security Lost? 
The Climate Change Conundrum
This section was authored by Deepa Badrinarayana, Professor, 
Chapman University, Dale E. Fowler School of Law.
Consider the following definition, quotation, and Work-
ing Group II empirical claims:
48 . Kivalina, 696 F .3d at 858 .
49 . Stephen Sackur, The Alaskan Village Set to Disappear Under Water in a 
Decade, BBC News Mag ., July 29, 2013, http://www .bbc .com/news/
magazine-23346370 .
From the Oxford English Dictionary: “Security: The state 
of being free from danger or threat .  .  .  . Origin: late mid-
dle English: from Old French securite or Latin securitas 
from securus ‘free from care’ .”50
From the United Nations: “We need another pro-
found transition in thinking—from nuclear security to 
human security .”51
From Working Group III: All aspects of food security are 
potentially affected by climate change, including food 
access, utilization, and price stability (high confidence) .
Climate change over the 21st century is projected to 
increase displacement of people (medium evidence, high 
agreement) .
Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent 
conflicts in the form of civil war and inter-group violence 
by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts 
such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence) .
The impacts of climate change on the critical infrastruc-
ture and territorial integrity of many states are expected 
to influence national security policies (medium evidence, 
medium agreement) .52
In 1945, nations that came together to establish the 
United Nations (U .N .) had one clear goal: to remove the 
scourge of war, two of which had debilitated a significant 
portion of the world . The U .N . had a singular mission: to 
maintain peace and security .53 The Security Council was 
established as the decisionmaking body to address security 
threats .54 However, nations also realized the importance of 
international cooperation, the need to achieve economic 
growth, and the need to protect social and cultural struc-
tures, while at the same time protecting human rights and 
ensuring justice . They vested in the U .N . the responsibil-
ity to foster good international relations among nations .55 
Implicit in this structure was a confidence that secure 
nations with sound socioeconomic and political structures 
would cater to the needs of their citizens .
In 1994, nations heralded the end of another “war,” the 
Cold War . By then, the world was a much different place . 
Security of nations in the traditional territorial sense no 
longer occupied center stage . Rather, the state of people 
within nations gained focus, and that focus was on human 
security . The U .N . Development Programme, in its 1994 
Human Development Report, introduced an endless list 
of human security concerns that warranted international 
attention—from energy to food to displacement of people 
to water scarcity to human rights abuses to any aspect of 
50 . Oxford English Dictionary, available at http://www .oxforddictionaries .
com/definition/english/security (last visited Oct . 17, 2014) .
51 . U .N . Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1994 
(New York: United States, 1994), available at http://hdr .undp .org/sites/de-
fault/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats .pdf .
52 . WGII: Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 8 .
53 . U .N . Charter, available at www .un .org/en/documents/charter/chapter1 .
shtml .
54 . Id. art . 7 .
55 . U .N . Charter, supra note 53 .
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human integrity and well-being . Human security, how-
ever, did not gain the center stage in international law in 
the same way as national security, with the exception of 
international intervention in internal civil wars in some 
nations . After all, why should international law have a role 
in purely domestic matters? Instead, subnational and non-
government entities that began to mushroom in the 1990s, 
plus individuals, made an effort to fill the gap left by inter-
national law by creating networks to influence laws, create 
policies, and/or to implement solutions .56
Climate change triggers traditional national security 
and human security concerns . According to AR5, climate 
change can increase human security concerns, as well as 
national security concerns, including concerns about secu-
rity in property . The establishment of climate security 
organizations composed of retired military generals sig-
nals the gravity of the security threats that climate change 
presents . In the United States, identified national security 
threats include everything from threats to military instal-
lations from sea-level rise to international competition for 
natural resources in the Arctic region .57 Human security 
threats also abound: loss of food resources; displacement 
of people; loss of livelihood; civil war; and loss of property, 
to name a few .
Yet, the security risks of climate change have failed to 
catalyze international legal response . Major GHG emitters 
are instead using arguments of human security to avoid 
international legal obligations . The United States has been 
arguing that it will suffer competition loss that could result 
in loss of livelihood if it enters into a treaty that does not 
bind China to similar obligations . Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and Russia have joined in this viewpoint for the sec-
ond commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol . China and 
India have been arguing that the short-term needs of their 
citizens, from energy to food to other basic needs, require 
them to develop without emissions reduction obligations . 
For these nations, the short-term security needs of their 
peoples come before their long-term interests .
There are those nations, however, that face both short-
term and long-term security risks . Small island nations 
whose territorial integrity is challenged by rising sea lev-
els face physical threat to their borders . However, despite 
acknowledgment of security threats by the United States 
and other nations, there is no international action on 
this issue . Neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol 
uses the word “security .” Instead, nations are focusing on 
building national resilience to climate change impacts .58 
56 . Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 15-16 (2004); Kal 
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va . J . Int’l L . 1 (2002); 
Margaret E . Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy Net-
works in International Politics, Activists Beyond Borders (1998) .
57 . Center for Climate & Security, Secretary Hagel on Climate Change Af-
fecting the Security Environment, Oct . 12, 2014, http://climateandsecu-
rity .org/2014/10/12/secretary-hagel-on-climate-change-affecting-the- 
security-environment/ .
58 . U .S . Department of Defense, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation 
Roadmap (2014), available at http://www .acq .osd .mil/ie/download/CCA-
Rprin t .pdf .
The implicit message appears to be that the U .N . man-
date to maintain peace and security is limited to threats 
from traditional “war-like” aggression . Of course, even if 
the U .N . Security Council were to undertake this matter, 
what would a permanent membership composed of United 
States and China decide that might be different from their 
stance on climate change treaty obligations?
For some other nations, such as sub-Saharan African 
nations, climate change presents nearly insurmountable 
risks to human security—food insecurity, water scarcity, 
livelihood insecurity, and property insecurity . However, 
these insecurities already exist in these countries . The dif-
ference between some of these countries and emerging 
economies like China and India is that the sub-Saharan 
African nations are not in a place of economic development 
that apparently promises to address short-term human 
security needs . They are also not in a position to mitigate 
climate change .
Finally, there are a group of countries, oil-producing 
nations such as the Middle East nations, that face their 
own security issues . Climate change may disrupt their 
long-term security, but mitigation efforts could upend 
their short-term security, because of their limited economic 
portfolio, primarily in fossil fuels .
The world viewed from the lens of climate security is 
a mismatch of national interests and security concerns . It 
begs the question of whether economic growth or reversal of 
the current economic system can ensure security, especially 
in a world divided by physical boundaries but united by 
one atmosphere . Just as climate change itself poses differ-
ent kinds of security risks in different nations, so, too, does 
actually dealing with climate change . As a result, it is time 
to rethink the international law framework—period—in 
order to deal with these very real security complexities .
VII. Approaching Climate Change Through 
Systems Thinking
This section was authored by Keith H. Hirokawa, Professor of 
Law, Albany Law School.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers identi-
fies natural and built infrastructure challenges as crucial to 
an adaptation strategy, as follows:
Climate change will have profound impacts on a broad 
spectrum of infrastructure systems (water and energy sup-
ply, sanitation and drainage, transport and telecommu-
nication), services (including health care and emergency 
services), the built environment, and ecosystem services . 
These interact with other social, economic, and environ-
mental stressors exacerbating and compounding risks to 
individual and household well-being (medium confidence 
based on high agreement, medium evidence) .59
In this statement, the Working Group identifies the 
wide range of social, economic, and environmental assets 
59 . WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch . 8 at 3 .
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and responsibilities that will be challenged by climate 
changes . For our purposes, it is significant that the IPCC 
chose to associate the costs of sustaining infrastructure and 
services with the built environment and ecosystem services . 
My observation is simple: If infrastructure and the built 
environment are to be sustainable in the face of climate 
changes—if it will have the capacity to meet the social, 
economic, and environmental necessities of our time and 
over time—then an understanding of ecological services 
must be incorporated into infrastructure and built envi-
ronment planning . Sound decisions about infrastructure 
and public services cannot be made without considering 
the relationship between essential services provision and 
ecosystem structure and function .
Consider, for example, water infrastructure . Water 
infrastructure provides clean and sufficient water for drink-
ing, as well as other water-intensive uses such as irrigated 
agriculture and industry; transports water to where it is 
needed; treats waste and stormwater; handles storm surges 
and provides safety from such surges; and also provides rec-
reational and community opportunities . The water system 
provides these services through the construction of an arti-
ficial system of physical capture and conveyance, storage, 
and treatment . The system’s strength is assessed by volume 
provision and miles of pipe .
That water infrastructure is addressed in climate change 
planning is no small thing: Without an effective infra-
structure, individuals may be unable to obtain basic needs, 
and the consequences will be catastrophic . Of course, pub-
lic access to adequate water is often difficult to ensure . As 
such, the IPCC statement acknowledges the immense cost 
of infrastructure maintenance and replacement into the 
next century, as well as the “profound” importance that 
civil society effectively plan for scarcity and challenges 
to the provision of basic human needs . It is of significant 
consequence that this observation arises in the context of 
urban resilience . As Alexandra Klass notes in the section 
immediately below, a shift toward urbanization that began 
over one century ago continues and even accelerates into 
the next century .
Society is becoming more urbanized, and human popu-
lation is becoming more concentrated and, accordingly, 
efficient and effective provision of public essential services 
has become paramount . These changes require that gov-
ernance prioritize planning to overcome the significant 
challenges faced in meeting infrastructure needs in human 
population centers . The challenges are real with regard 
to physical and financial projections . According to one 
estimate, the average cost of water infrastructure replace-
ment in the developed world will range from $550-$2,300 
to $6,300 per household for smaller systems, and up to 
$10,000 per household if treatment plants and pumps 
need replacement . In the meantime, the useful life of water 
infrastructure has declined: The average life expectancy 
for gray infrastructure has decreased from 120 years (for 
systems features installed in the late 1800s) down to 75 
years for post-World War II infrastructure . The staggered 
life expectancies of water infrastructure components makes 
financing infrastructure more complicated, including equi-
tably allocating scarce resources to the replacement where 
and when systems come to the end of their useful life .
The foregoing example suggests the capture of substan-
tial benefits from combining our assessment of necessary 
infrastructure with an inventory of ecosystem services . 
Ecosystem services is an approach to ecology and econom-
ics that focuses on ecosystem processes and ecosystem 
functionality .60 This approach values the manner in which 
ecosystems produce goods of value, the manner in which 
ecosystems provide services that are essential to human 
well-being, and the economic value that can be attributed 
to functioning ecosystems as the value of the services they 
provide . The change in thinking toward ecosystem services 
is a monumental move toward climate change prepared-
ness . Consider two realizations that come with ecosystem 
services thinking: (1) we have typically displaced and inter-
rupted ecosystems to build infrastructure systems and the 
built environment; and (2) built infrastructure does not last 
forever . Ecosystem services thinking offers an additional 
opportunity in infrastructure planning that envisions flex-
ibility, adaptive reasoning, and risk analysis . Ecosystem 
services thinking requires us to identify the ways that we 
rely on functioning ecosystems for clean air and water, 
temperature control, nutrient cycling, spiritual grounding, 
and a host of other services that are so essential to life that 
they often cannot be artificially replaced .
The thrust of ecosystem services thinking is that we 
need to break from commodity-based valuation . By focus-
ing attention on the market values of goods that can be 
taken from ecosystems, without also accounting for the 
methods of sustaining the production of those goods or 
the loss of production in the future, we have expedited the 
decline of functionality throughout the natural systems . 
Both consumption and the corresponding inattention to 
ecosystem functions that occurs in the commodification of 
nature have limited the ability of ecosystems to regenerate 
and sustain themselves, requiring the production of substi-
tutes . From this perspective, a resilient water infrastructure 
system will recognize the role that natural systems play in 
producing clean and sufficient water (rivers, lakes, streams, 
groundwater aquifers, floodplains, floodways, wetlands, 
and the watersheds), and will integrate those processes in 
formulating the means to capture, treat, store, and deliver 
water to places it is needed .
Switching to an ecosystem services accounting, or at 
least incorporating ecosystem services into the infrastruc-
ture accounting, will produce better planning decisions . 
Examples of the benefits of ecosystem services planning are 
illustrated in the watershed investments in New York City 
and Seattle, where the acquisition of real property interests 
throughout the watershed has captured the value of eco-
60 . See, e.g., Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosys-
tems (Gretchen C . Daily ed ., 1997); Robert Costanza et al ., The Value of 
the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 Nature 253 (1997); 
Robert Costanza & Herman E . Daly, Natural Capital and Sustainable De-
velopment, 6 Conservation Biology 37 (1992) .
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system services in providing quality and quantity of public 
water supplies; or Santa Fe, which is currently identifying 
forest management practices that will facilitate the capture 
of watershed service from the ecosystem and help avoid the 
gargantuan costs of losing such services from forest fires 
and other events .
These cities are investing in ecosystem functionality 
to ensure that watersheds are performing as they can and 
should, at a fraction of the cost of built infrastructure, and 
as a minimal maintenance cost over time . The cities have 
incorporated the wisdom of ecosystem services: The built 
or gray infrastructure that comprise their water systems 
are designed to provide services that are already provided 
by natural systems, including water and sewer, storm and 
flood protection, temperature control and climate stabili-
zation, waste cycling and assimilation, and other natural 
services . As an additional benefit, natural systems provide 
these services very effectively and efficiently, while also 
securing other foundational goods and services, including 
oxygen, water, land, recreational opportunities, aesthetic 
value and spiritual attachment, and energy .
Although ecosystem services planning is a new 
approach, it is essential that water managers incorporate 
ecosystem services concepts into the decisionmaking pro-
cess . The result of such an integration would be to capture 
the benefits of functioning ecosystems, while protecting 
the valuable assets of natural capital . Ecosystem services 
thinking connects ecosystem function with basic human 
needs—not merely as a means to protect the environment, 
but as a means to assure human well-being .
VIII. Climate Change and Cities
This section was authored by Alexandra B. Klass, Professor of 
Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
For the first time in 2014, in AR5’s volume on miti-
gation of climate change, the IPCC included a sepa-
rate chapter, Chapter 12, entitled Human Settlements, 
Infrastructure, and Spatial Planning . According to the 
IPCC, “[s]ince the publication of the Fourth Assessment 
Report, there has been a growing recognition of the sig-
nificant contribution of urban areas to GHG [greenhouse 
gas] emissions, their potential role in mitigating them, 
and a multi-fold increase in the corresponding scientific 
literature .”61 In both Chapter 12 of the Mitigation of Cli-
mate Change volume and the Summary for Policymakers 
for that volume, the IPCC concludes:
Thousands of Cities are undertaking climate action plans, 
but their aggregate impact on urban emissions is uncer-
tain (robust evidence, high agreement) .62
There has been little systematic assessment on their 
implementation, the extent to which emission reduction 
61 . IPCC, AR5, Mitigation of Climate Change, ch . 12: Human Settle-
ments, Infrastructure, and Spatial Planning 7 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC, 
Mitigation of Climate Change]; WGIII: Summary for Policymakers, 
supra note 2, at 26 .
62 . WGIII: Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 27 .
targets are being achieved, or emissions reduced . Current 
climate action plans focus largely on energy efficiency . 
Fewer climate action plans consider land use planning 
strategies and cross-sectoral measures to reduce sprawl 
and promote transit-oriented development .63 The urban-
ization of the world and the impact of that urbanization 
on GHG emissions are significant . Today, more than one-
half the global population is urban, as compared to only 
13% in 1900 .64 By 2050, the global urban population is 
expected to increase by 2 .5-3 .0 billion, corresponding 
to nearly 70% of the world’s population .65 Today, urban 
areas account for approximately 75% of global energy use 
and the same amount of CO2 emissions from global ener-
gy .66 Moreover, the majority of future urban population 
growth will take place in small- or medium-size urban 
areas in developing countries .67
There is both potential and risk with this type of growth . 
Because such development will be mostly new, there is the 
potential to create buildings, other infrastructure, trans-
portation, and land use plans that maximize efficiency 
and reduce GHG emissions from the outset, as opposed 
to having to retrofit existing buildings, infrastructure, and 
transportation networks . On the other hand, because most 
of this urban growth will be in developing countries, there 
is the risk that lack of political will, coupled with limited 
institutional and financial capacity, will result in low-effi-
ciency buildings and infrastructure and urban sprawl .
As noted in the AR5, thousands of cities are undertak-
ing climate action plans, raising the issue of what kind of 
GHG emissions cities can actually control . According to 
the U .S . Energy Information Agency (EIA), the factors 
that contribute to statewide per-capita GHG emissions 
(and thus impact urban GHG emissions) include climate 
(significant cold or hot weather results in more energy-
related emissions in urban areas), the structure of the state 
economy (energy-producing economies are more carbon-
intensive), population density, energy sources, building 
standards, and explicit state policies to reduce emissions .
With regard to these factors, cities have little control 
over their baseline climate, although planners of new cities 
can attempt to concentrate development in more moder-
ate regions . Cities have some but not significant control 
over whether they build their economies on energy produc-
tion or on non-energy-producing activities such as finance, 
higher education, or high-tech industries . Energy-produc-
ing economies are tied to the physical location of energy 
resources, which means cities near energy resources will 
generally base their economies on development of those 
resources, leading to greater GHG emissions . But cities 
can choose to focus on other economic drivers, such as 
high-tech or higher education, if they create the amenities 
to draw the target companies and workers to those cities . 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is an example of a city that has 
63 . IPCC, Mitigation of Climate Change, ch . 12, at 6 .
64 . Id. at 7 .
65 . Id. at 4 .
66 . Id .
67 . Id. at 7 .
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made a significant effort in recent decades to transition 
from an energy-intensive economy (coal mining and steel 
manufacturing) to one based on higher education, medi-
cine, and high-tech industries .
Cities also have some, and increasingly significant, con-
trol over the energy sources they use for heating and elec-
tricity . Although state public utility commissions and state 
legislatures make many of the primary decisions regard-
ing energy use in the state, cities are increasingly choos-
ing to limit their use of coal and other fossil fuels and to 
shift their energy uses to natural gas and renewable energy . 
Chicago, Illinois, is an example of a city that has made a 
policy choice to reduce coal in its electricity mix and rely 
much more heavily on renewable energy by promoting an 
“electric aggregation” program, whereby it enters into long-
term power purchase agreements with electricity suppli-
ers on behalf of its citizens . By negotiating a new price for 
all of its residents under one contract, Chicago can use its 
bargaining power to lower electricity rates and/or demand 
certain types of generation like wind, solar, and natural gas 
and eliminate or reduce reliance on coal .
Cities have even more control over building efficien-
cies, density, and mass transit, all of which have significant 
impacts on urban GHG emissions . While it is difficult 
to make major changes to existing building efficiency, 
transportation infrastructure, and density because such 
investments are prone to “lock-in” of energy and emis-
sions pathways, many European and Asian cities and even 
some U .S cities that have a long history of high density 
and excellent mass transit are good examples for future 
urban development .
But many city efforts in this area have focused on the 
energy efficiency of buildings . This is not surprising as 
buildings are a major contributor to GHG emissions and 
a source of such emissions over which cities have signifi-
cant control . In the United States, buildings account for 
39% of total energy use and 68% of electricity use . As a 
result, increasing the efficiency of electricity use in build-
ings has the potential to reduce overall energy use, lead-
ing to decreased energy costs, reduced need to build more 
power plants, greater energy security, and significant envi-
ronmental protection benefits . The consulting firm McK-
insey & Company estimates that $520 billion invested in 
non-transportation energy efficiency in the United States 
by 2020 could generate energy savings worth over $1 .2 
trillion, reduce end-use energy demand by 23% of current 
projections, and as a co-benefit provide over 1 .1 billion tons 
of GHG reductions .68 On a global scale, of course, these 
benefits multiply exponentially .
U .S . cities are beginning to enact innovative policies 
to “benchmark” commercial buildings by collecting, dis-
closing, and analyzing building energy consumption data . 
With such data, cities can encourage market transactions 
that allow more efficient buildings to benefit, shape energy-
efficient behavior of building owners, and learn from that 
68 . McKinsey & Co ., Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U .S . Economy 
iii (July 2009) .
data to shape future city policies and guide building con-
struction policies in the new cities that will inevitably result 
from the urbanization of the world’s population .
The cities of Austin, Texas; Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
New York City; Seattle, Washington; and Washington, 
D .C ., all impose some form of benchmarking requirements 
on commercial buildings and mandate some information 
disclosure to local governments or prospective buyers to 
increase demand for energy-efficient buildings . Neverthe-
less, even though this is one area where cities have signifi-
cant regulatory authority, barriers to collecting such data 
as a result of public utility privacy policies and sometimes 
state public utility commission privacy policies make the 
data collection difficult . For instance, some public utilities 
do not provide such data in a uniform format that can be 
easily analyzed by customers or third parties . State privacy 
laws also can pose a barrier to accessible energy consump-
tion data because they direct the utilities to disclose such 
data only in highly aggregated form that makes it diffi-
cult for third-party energy-efficiency providers or policy-
makers to determine trends, recommend energy-efficiency 
improvements, or otherwise analyze the data for research 
or consulting purposes . Some states, such as California, 
are in the process of developing rules to balance any pri-
vacy interests in energy consumption data with the need to 
make such data available to shape energy-efficiency policies 
and allow cities to make GHG reductions in their building 
stock . But most states have no policies in place at all and 
thus are limiting the ability of cities to engage in GHG 
mitigation in the areas in which they would otherwise have 
the most authority to act .
In sum, cities will play an increasingly significant role 
in contributing to worldwide GHG emissions, but also 
have the potential to make major contributions to GHG 
mitigation efforts with the right policies in place . In order 
to realize that potential, however, cities must be given the 
tools to collect, analyze, and use energy consumption data 
to improve building efficiency . If cities are able to make 
strides in this area, their research and policies can serve as 
models for the cities of the future .
IX. Urban Community Collaborative
This section was authored by Jonathan Rosenbloom, Associate 
Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.
Working Group II, discussing impacts, adaptation, and 
vulnerability, makes the following empirical claim:
Coordinated support from higher levels of governments, 
the private sector and civil society and horizontal learn-
ing through networks of cities and practitioners benefits 
urban adaptation (medium confidence based on medium 
agreement, medium evidence) .69
Unfortunately, Working Group II (and the other Work-
ing Groups) provided little detail as to what it envisioned 
as “horizontal learning” or a “network of cities” and how 
69 . WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch . 8 .
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they may benefit urban adaptation . Working Group II also 
omitted this statement from its Summary for Policymakers .
Because I interpret the statement as referring, in part, to 
self-coordinated collective action among urban communi-
ties throughout the world, and because I believe an urban 
community collaborative has the potential to be a pow-
erful and realistic alternative in mitigating and adapting 
to climate change, this section considers what an urban 
community collaborative could look like and the potential 
it holds . My hope is that the IPCC continues to increase 
its recognition of urban centers and the cumulative impact 
they may have when collaborating to reduce GHG emis-
sions . As part of this, the IPCC should include the state-
ment above or a similar one pertaining to self-coordinated 
collective action among urban communities in its future 
reports and, at a minimum, discuss the possibilities and 
challenges of an urban community collaborative .70
The AR5 reiterates many facts that indicate the impor-
tance and relevance of urban areas in the debate on cli-
mate change, including continued population growth and 
continued increase in the amount of emissions originating 
from urban areas . The Report notes the need for cities to 
mitigate and adapt to climate changing conditions,71 while 
also noting significant obstacles to achieving adaptation or 
mitigation, including a lack of local resources .72
From an urban governance perspective, bridging the 
gap between action on climate change and the making 
of day-to-day policies at the local level is as complex as it 
is critical to reducing GHG emissions . Bridging this gap 
includes overcoming deficiencies in financial and human 
capital, lack of information concerning the challenges and 
possible solutions, and other operational and legal obsta-
cles . For example, there are likely few local governments 
that have the time or resources necessary to analyze the 
IPCC’s Report and ponder adequate responses to it . Even if 
a local government had the time and resources, it would be 
inefficient for thousands of local governments to research 
and draft policies when many of those local governments 
are confronting similar challenges that can be addressed 
with similar solutions .
One way to help move from the Report to implemen-
tation at the local level is through an urban community 
collaborative in which local governments horizontally 
coordinate and agree to enact coordinated, legally bind-
70 . The IPCC’s Synthesis Report of the Fifth Assessment Report devotes an entire 
section to subnational action on climate change (4 .4 .2), although it only 
gives a passing mention to subnational collaborations in Section 4 .4 .2 .2:
Sub-national climate policies are increasingly prevalent, both in 
countries with national policies and in those without . These poli-
cies include state and provincial climate plans combining market, 
regulatory and information instruments, and sub-national cap-and-
trade systems . In addition, transnational cooperation has arisen 
among sub-national actors, notably among institutional investors, 
NGOs seeking to govern carbon offset markets, and networks of 
cities seeking to collaborate in generating low-carbon urban devel-
opment . [13 .5 .2, 15 .2 .4, 15 .8]
71 . Id. at 3 (“Action in urban centres is essential to successful global climate 
change adaptation”); WGIII AR5, supra note 18, ch . 4 (noting the impor-
tance of “bottom-up approaches, engaging participation of diverse countries 
and actors, creating procedurally equitable forms of decentralization”) .
72 . WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch . 8 at 4-6 .
ing policies to reduce GHG emissions . These policies 
could go far beyond the climate action reports mentioned 
by the IPCC . They could include a diverse and detailed 
array of local functions ranging from local procurement 
policies to school lunch programs to zoning and build-
ing codes . Reviewing the many aspects of local gover-
nance that affect GHG emissions and reconsidering how 
to amend policies to lower emissions across functions is 
a gargantuan task . However, if that task is spread among 
the thousands of local governments, it may not only be 
more manageable to a single local government, but it also 
may be more efficient and help expedite the reduction of 
GHG emissions .
There are several groups collaborating around local 
governments that work to facilitate a reduction in GHG 
emissions, including the U .S . Conference of Mayors Cli-
mate Protection Agreement,73 C40 Cities Climate Leader-
ship Group,74 United Cities & Local Governments,75 and 
ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability .76 None of 
these, however, place binding obligations on local govern-
ments or have enforcement mechanisms . They are predom-
inantly focused on voluntarily sharing best practices and 
information on climate change . While obviously helpful 
in moving cities forward, it is not surprising that the IPCC 
found that “[t]housands of Cities are undertaking climate 
action plans, but their aggregate impact on urban emis-
sions is uncertain (robust evidence, high agreement) .”77
While a successful urban community collaborative 
could take many forms, at a minimum, it would likely 
require local governments to have: (1)  legal authority at 
the international, national, and subnational levels to enter 
into an urban community collaborative; (2) recognition of 
an affirmative obligation to mitigate climate change that 
cannot be abrogated by higher levels of authority (inter-
national, national, and subnational); and (3)  the political 
will to set binding obligations and to enforce standards to 
reduce free-riding and minimize leakage .
There are no doubt legal, political, and logistical chal-
lenges to each of these three (not the least of which involves 
national sovereignty and legal supremacy) . And I under-
stand the significance of the matching principle and the 
virtues of having an international body address a global 
issue such as climate change . But if the international com-
munity is unable to act and there is a willingness among 
local governments to act, then why not allow them to do 
so? Even if the international community is able to act, hav-
ing both cities and nations work to lower GHG emissions 
73 . U .S . Conference of Mayors, Climate Protection Agreement, http://www .
usmayors .org/climateprotection/agreement .htm (last visited Oct . 20, 
2014) .
74 . C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, C40, http://www .c40 .org/ (last 
visited Oct . 20, 2014) .
75 . United Cities & Local Governments, Global Network of Cities, Local 
and Regional Governments, http://www .uclg .org/en/organisation/about (last 
visited Oct . 20, 2014) .
76 . ICLEI Global-Local Governments for Sustainability, Sustainable 
City, http://www .iclei .org/our-activities/our-agendas/sustainable-city .html 
(last visited Oct . 20, 2014) .
77 . WGIII: Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 7 .
Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
45 ELR 10040 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 1-2015
and climate change impacts would be a positive and more-
comprehensive approach .
On the one hand, urban areas, as large global emitters 
that may be fractured and divided, represent a massive 
tragedy of the commons collective action problem . On 
the other hand, they represent an enormous opportunity 
to self-coordinate78 and sustainably manage their GHG 
emissions . A collaborative of only the 20 largest cities by 
population, for example, would represent more people 
than any other country, except China, India, and the 
United States .
As the IPCC notes, there are numerous local govern-
ments individually taking steps to mitigate climate change . 
It is not enough for the international, national, and subna-
tional governments to verbally (and, at times, financially) 
support local efforts . They need to provide local govern-
ments with the legal authority to collaborate and to mul-
tijurisdictionally regulate climate change . Without some 
type of sharing of resources and coordinated efforts, it 
seems too large of a task to ask thousands of urban areas 
to translate the AR5 report into local action . While not all 
cities are willing or prepared to address climate change, 
those that are willing or prepared represent an untapped 
opportunity to reduce GHG emissions . The international 
community should make it a priority for these cities to 
horizontally coordinate to sustainably manage the climate 
change challenges they are facing .
X. Big Box Resiliency: U.S. Suburbs and 
Climate Change
This section was authored by Sarah Adams-Schoen, Assistant 
Professor of Law at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law 
Center and Director of the Institute on Land Use & Sustain-
able Development Law.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers includes 
the following empirical claims:
Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat 
waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires, reveal 
significant vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems 
and many human systems to current climate variability 
(very high confidence) . Impacts of such climate-related 
extremes include alteration of ecosystems, disruption of 
food production and water supply, damage to infrastruc-
ture and settlements, morbidity and mortality, and con-
sequences for mental health and human well-being . For 
countries at all levels of development, these impacts are 
consistent with a significant lack of preparedness for cur-
rent climate variability in some sectors .79
In North America, governments are engaging in incre-
mental adaptation assessment and planning, particularly 
at the municipal level . Some proactive adaptation is occur-
78 . See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of In-
stitutions for Collective Action (1990) .
79 . WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 6 (footnote omitted) .
ring to protect longer-term investments in energy and 
public infrastructure .80
These statements hint at a failure across all levels of gov-
ernment in the United States—specifically, a significant 
gap between vulnerabilities and preparedness . Although 
the Summary for Policymakers recognizes the greater 
efforts of U .S . municipal governments, as compared to 
federal and state governments, U .S . municipalities still lag 
behind their counterparts throughout the world .
Living on Long Island, New York—home to the first 
planned suburb—I am reminded that suburbs pose their 
own challenges with respect to climate change . Although 
the distinct characteristics of suburbs may be appropriately 
outside the purview of the IPCC,81 recognizing these char-
acteristics, and the legal context within which they occur, 
is essential for effective preparedness in the United States . 
In this country, the majority of the population resides in 
suburbs, suburbs have a higher per-capita carbon footprint 
than urban areas, and suburbs are less likely to take action 
on climate change .82
Suburban communities need encouragement and sup-
port to assess their climate vulnerabilities, plan and imple-
ment adaptation and mitigation strategies, and, in some 
cases, expand their current efforts beyond building and 
vehicle initiatives to land use and planning measures .83 As 
one commentator has noted, “[S]o far, climate action has 
extended slowly to suburbia . Central cities in smart growth 
states have taken on climate change, but vast swaths of 
metropolitan suburbia continue to reproduce a political 
geography of local free-riding .”84
The AR5 highlights the importance of “city and munici-
pal governments acting now to incorporate climate change 
adaptation into their development plans and policies and 
infrastructure investments,”85 characterizing “[a]ction in 
urban centres [as] essential to successful global climate 
change adaptation .”86 Additionally, the AR5 finds that 
“[u]rban adaptation action that delivers mitigation co-
benefits is a powerful, resource-efficient means to address 
climate change and to realize sustainable development 
goals (medium confidence based on high agreement, medium 
evidence) .”87 The role of urban areas, including their sub-
urbs, “includes not only building [a] foundation of resil-
ience  .   .   . but also mobilizing new resources, adjusting 
80 . Id. at 8 .
81 . As used in the AR5, the term “urban” appears to encompass suburbs . See 
WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch . 8 at 6, available at http://www .ipcc .ch/
report/ar5/wg2/ .
82 . John R . Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy: Shifting Ground 
to Mitigate Climate Change, 34 Wm . & Mary Envtl . L . & Pol’y Rev . 1, 3-4 
(2009) .
83 . Hari M . Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts: Possibilities for Small 
and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and Interna-
tional Networks, 22 Cornell J .L . & Pub . Pol’y 395, 440 (2012) .
84 . Yonn Dierwechter, Metropolitan Geographies of U.S. Climate Action: Cities, 
Suburbs, and the Local Divide in Global Responsibilities, 12 J . Envtl . Pol’y 
& Plan . 59, 79 (2010); Osofsky, supra note 83 .
85 . WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch . 8 at 6 .
86 . Id. at 3 .
87 . Id.
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building and land-use regulations and continuously devel-
oping the local capacity to respond .”88
Despite this critical role, climate adaptation planning 
appears to be a lower priority in the United States than 
just about anywhere else .89 According to a survey adminis-
tered in 2011, the United States has the lowest percentage 
of cities pursuing adaptation planning out of all regions 
surveyed (59%), while Latin American and Canadian cit-
ies have the highest (95% and 92%, respectively) .90 The 
United States also has the lowest percentage of cities that 
have completed an assessment of their vulnerabilities and 
risks (13%) .91
Local governments throughout the United States need 
more federal and state support .92 State law delegates much 
of the authority relevant to climate change adaptation and 
mitigation to municipal governments, and yet state and 
federal policy fails to support local governments in this role 
through adequate funding and technical support .93
To provide adequate guidance and support to local com-
munities, state and federal governments need to take into 
consideration the context of those communities . Indeed, 
the Summary for Policymakers found that “[a]daptation 
is place- and context-specific, with no single approach 
for reducing risks appropriate across all settings (high 
confidence) .”94 Moreover, effective adaptation planning and 
implementation, as well as mitigation, may benefit from 
recognizing not only that suburbs are distinct from urban 
cores, but also that different types of suburbs exist, each 
of which present distinct challenges and opportunities for 
building community resilience .95
We have an opportunity now to create communities 
that are resilient to climate-related risks, and that provide 
mitigation co-benefits . Sixty-six percent of the buildings 
in existence by the year 2050 will be built between now 
and then .96 By 2040, the United States is projected to add 
93 million new homes to accommodate its rapidly grow-
ing population . Based on current trends, most of these 
homes will be single-family homes that are significantly 
less energy-efficient than their multifamily counterparts; 
and, based on current planning practices, the occupants of 
88 . Id. at 6 .
89 . JoAnn Carmin et al ., ICLEI USA-Local Governments for Sustainability, 
Progress and Challenges in Urban Climate Adaptation Planning: Results of a 
Global Survey (2012), available at http://www .icleiusa .org/action-center/
learn-from-others/progress-and-challenges-in-urban-climate-adaptation-
planning-results-of-a-global-survey .
90 . Id. at 14 .
91 . Id. at 10 .
92 . Id. at 24 .
93 . See John R . Nolon, Climate Change and Sustainable Development: The Quest 
for Green Communities—Part II, 61 Planning & Envtl . L . No . 11, p . 3 
(2009); but see New York Community Risk and Resiliency Act, Ch . 355, 
N .Y . Laws of 2014 (directing state agencies to prepare model municipal laws 
taking into consideration sea-level rise and other climate-related events and 
“develop additional guidance on the use of resiliency measures that utilize 
natural resources and natural processes to reduce risk”) .
94 . WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 25 .
95 . See Osofsky, supra note 83; Russell Lopez, Urban Sprawl in the United 
States: 1970-2010, 7 Cities & the Env’t (CATE), art . 7 (2014), available 
at http://digitalcommons .lmu .edu/cate/vol7/iss1/7 .
96 . Nolon, supra note 82, at 6 .
these single-family homes will continue to commute by car 
to work, play, and shop .97
It is therefore crucial that local, state, and federal gov-
ernments act now to assess the role of suburbs in climate 
change adaptation and mitigation, and support these enti-
ties in their development of adaptation plans, policies, and 
infrastructure investments . Otherwise, we are likely to see, 
at best, the continued “incremental adaptation assessment 
and planning”98 with little implementation observed in the 
Summary for Policymakers, and, at worst, maladaptive 
changes in suburban infrastructure and land uses .
XI. The Bottom-Up Climate Consensus
This section was authored by Stephen R. Miller, Associate Pro-
fessor, University of Idaho College of Law.
Working Group III’s Summary for Policymakers 
includes the following empirical claim:
The largest mitigation opportunities with respect to 
human settlements are in rapidly urbanizing areas where 
urban form and infrastructure are not locked in, but 
where there are often limited governance, technical, finan-
cial, and institutional capacities .99
The IPCC is comprehensive in its scope and conclusive 
in its evidence for climate change . Why, then, has the AR5 
failed to be persuasive and, in fact, has seemed to spark a 
counteroffensive against the idea of climate change gen-
erally? The backlash is a many-headed hydra, but at the 
local level, its growth is manifest in anti-Agenda 21 screeds 
increasingly heard against local climate action plans in 
town halls across the United States . It is easy to write off 
the climate change backlash as either political posturing 
or ignorance . That would be a mistake; engagement is 
necessary . What the IPCC process needs now is not more 
science to prove climate change exists; rather, it needs an 
approach to planning for climate change that builds con-
sensus and engages diverse stakeholders at the local level 
where development decisions are made .
While state and federal laws have, within the last few 
decades, increasingly limited local control, cities still make 
the lion’s share of choices over the shape of development 
in the United States . This decentralization of land use 
decisionmaking is especially important in understanding 
consensus and climate change: If there is no consensus 
to address climate change in these decentralized land use 
decisions, then it will be very difficult for the country as a 
whole to achieve a viable climate policy .
A brief review of the rise of cities makes their impor-
tance clear .100 Around 2010, more than one-half of the 
97 . See id.; Lopez, supra note 95 .
98 . WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 8 .
99 . WGIII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at §4 .2 .5 .
100 . See also Stephen R . Miller, The Sustainable, Inevitably Exploding City, in 
Michael Burger et al ., Rethinking Sustainability to Meet the Climate Change 
Challenge, 43 ELR 10342, 10346 (Apr . 2013); Boundaries of Nature and 
the American City, in Environmental Law and Contrasting Ideas 
of Nature: A Constructivist Approach (Keith Hirokawa ed ., 2014); 
Sustainable Cities of Tomorrow: A Land Use Response to Climate Change, in 
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world’s population was living in cities; by 2050, 70% of the 
world’s population will live in cities . The world is expected 
to add over 2 billion new people to the planet by 2050, 
which is the equivalent of building a new city of 1 .4 mil-
lion every week through the mid-century mark . Existing 
cities in industrialized nations, such as the United States, 
have “locked in” high energy use through high-energy 
infrastructure . The best chance of reducing GHG emis-
sion growth is for future cities in both industrialized and 
developing countries to build a low-carbon infrastructure .
This infrastructure imperative is both an unprecedented 
opportunity and an unprecedented challenge . It is an 
opportunity because, if we get city planning right in the 
21st century, we can have great places to live while at the 
same time mitigating and adapting to climate change . It 
is a challenge because the places where people are increas-
ingly moving, in industrialized nations, are cities that 
are specifically seeking to grow economically by permit-
ting inexpensive but high-GHG lifestyles . (In developing 
nations, not discussed here, different urbanization patterns 
arise, but also necessitate greater local consensus .)
Consider the complexity of consensus-building among 
cities in the United States . According to the last census, 
the two fastest growing regions of the country were the 
mountain West and the South . These are also states and 
cities that are deliberately luring in residents through 
policies promoting cheap living through easy, and largely 
unregulated, housing development . Such states and cities 
are equally luring businesses through concerted deregula-
tion and economic incentives from the Northeast, western 
coastal states, and the industrial Midwest . The approach 
has proven remarkably successful in terms of short-term 
economic growth . The poster child for this approach is 
Texas, which has one of the fastest growing economies, 
but also spends $0 .514 of every state dollar on economic 
development incentives to businesses, according to a New 
York Times study .101 In other words, the prospect of states 
like Texas, and most of the South and the mountain West, 
depends upon providing an alternative to the regulatory 
strictures of places taking climate change seriously . The 
current economic strategy of such locations is deliberately 
to welcome climate change regulation refugees .
Meaningful climate change consensus, then, requires 
a consensus among decentralized decisionmakers, such 
as states and cities, that climate change does matter and, 
accordingly, skirting regulation cannot be used as an eco-
nomic development tool . That will be a tough challenge . 
Finding consensus on climate policy is not easy even in 
progressive bastions . Take, for instance, the San Francisco 
region’s Plan Bay Area, arguably the country’s most impor-
tant effort to link land use and transportation planning 
to reduce climate change . The plan is the subject of four 
lawsuits by environmentalists, environmental justice advo-
Rethinking Sustainable Development to Meet the Climate Change 
Challenge (Jessica Owley & Keith Hirokawa eds ., forthcoming 2015) .
101 . Louise Story et al ., Explore Government Subsidies, N .Y . Times (2012), http://
www .nytimes .com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-incentives .html? 
_r=0#TX .
cates, “post-sustainability” anti-Agenda 21 groups, and a 
local real estate lobby . Thus, even with consensus on cli-
mate change’s existence, there is difficulty in building con-
sensus on the implementation of climate change planning 
and adaptation .
To address climate change, places like the American 
South and mountain West must want to build cities that 
are resource-efficient . Even in progressive locales like San 
Francisco, implications of climate change policy must be 
more forthcoming . Consensus-building must focus on 
detailing the day-to-day efforts necessary to mitigate and 
adapt to climate change . Facilitating local consensus on 
climate change has not been undertaken by the IPCC in 
any meaningful way . The IPCC reports acknowledge this 
deficiency to some extent . Buried deep in the Working 
Group II report is a call for “engaging stakeholders” in the 
process of climate change decisionmaking .102 However, as 
an indicator of the failure to engage, the section notes a 
recent study finding that only 40% of vulnerability map-
ping exercises included stakeholder participation, which 
“rais[ed] questions about the legitimacy and salience of 
contemporary approaches” to climate change planning .103
If we are to build or rebuild cities to benefit the climate, 
we must start the planning process with stakeholders’ daily 
lives and daily choices . The global impacts of small sacri-
fices must be clear; people need a vision of what it means 
to live a life that saves the planet in their own community . 
It is on the basis of those facts that consensus can be built, 
not just at the federal level, but also in town halls where 
development decisions are made . The IPCC has historically 
been a document of collective scientific reportage . What is 
needed now is a bottom-up component to the process, one 
in which individuals acting locally understand the climate 
implications of local actions .
When Georges-Eugène Haussmann was cutting impe-
rial boulevards through Paris’ medieval core, Charles 
Baudelaire wrote with solace, “The form of a city changes 
faster, alas, than the human heart .” As our cities, and our 
climate, now change even faster than our hearts, we must 
find paths to consensus—locally, nationally, and interna-
tionally—that work politically from the bottom up and 
give all of us a reason to forsake immediate gains in favor 
of a better life for generations to come .
XII. Protecting Habitat on the Move
This section was authored by Jessica Owley, Associate Profes-
sor, SUNY Buffalo Law School.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers makes 
the following empirical claims:
Many terrestrial, freshwater, and marine species have 
shifted their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, migra-
tion patterns, abundances, and species interactions in 
response to ongoing climate change (high confidence) .
102 . WGII AR5, supra note 32, at §8 .4 .2 .1 .
103 . Id.
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While only a few recent species extinctions have been 
attributed as yet to climate change (high confidence), nat-
ural global climate change at rates slower than current 
anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosys-
tem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions 
of years (high confidence) .104
These most recent findings of the IPCC confirm some-
thing that conservation biologists and other scientists have 
already been observing and writing about for years: Cli-
mate change means landscape change . As the world warms 
and sea level rises, ecosystems will both shift and recon-
figure . The AR5 designates this at its highest confidence 
level, stating that change has already occurred (and will 
continue to occur) and it will do so in virtually every type 
of landscape: terrestrial; freshwater; and marine life . As cli-
mate change results in changed landscapes, our strategies 
for how we interact and behave on the land has no choice 
but to shift as well . In particular, this section focuses on 
what this means for land conservation and goals of protect-
ing specific endangered species or ecosystems .
Current land conservation policies focus on static pro-
grams that assume land conserved today should be con-
served in the future, and that the same conservation goals 
will be met across time scales . Little attention has been paid 
to how changes to the landscape will affect the priorities of 
conserved land or how land management processes or land 
conservation strategies will need to change in response to 
changes on the land . For example, a 2011 survey of 73 land 
conservation organizations (both nonprofit organizations 
and government agencies) across the United States that use 
conservation easements as a land protection mechanism 
found that while most organizations agreed that climate 
change was likely to impact not only their region, but also 
their conservation efforts, few had taken or even planned 
to take active measures to respond to the likely changes .105 
Indeed, the private land conservation movement has been 
dominated by the use of perpetual property tools that set 
the status quo as the conservation goal in perpetuity with 
few mechanisms to revisit that goal or to consider whether 
the current makeup of the land will be either possible or 
desirable as climate change shifts landscapes .106
The AR5 report discusses the benefit of different types 
of land uses (suggesting that certain types of develop-
ment might be more harmful or that forestry could be 
a good thing if done right), but does not go so far as to 
discuss the legal mechanisms being used to protect and 
promote specific land uses .107 In the United States, conser-
vation easements have become the favored tool for private 
land protection . That trend is slowly spreading to other 
104 . WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 4 .
105 . See Adena R . Rissman et al ., Adapting Conservation Easements to Climate 
Change, Conservation Letters (2014), available at http://onlinelibrary .
wiley .com/doi/10 .1111/conl .12099/abstract;jsessionid=0B9D2389ABE77
6F762C692BD52885EB8 .f04t03?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&use
rIsAuthenticated=false .
106 . See Adena R . Rissman et al ., Private Land Conservation & Climate 
Change: Rethinking Strategies & Tools (forthcoming 2015) .
107 . See generally WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28 .
regions of the world, including other common-law coun-
tries like Australia and Canada, where property law tools 
are already similar to those in the United States, as well 
as places with other legal traditions like Latin America 
and Africa . Indeed, conservation easements are often the 
cornerstone of key climate change policies, such as the 
U .N . collaborative initiative REDD (Reducing Emissions 
From Deforestation and Forest Degradation), or sus-
tainable agriculture, where property agreements such as 
conservation easements and other servitudes burden the 
land, requiring adherence to certain environmental stan-
dards .108 In fact, conservation easements may be seen as a 
way to ensure that carbon sequestration gains are realized 
(for example, preventing forests from being cut down by 
subsequent landowners or prohibiting farmers from aban-
doning agricultural practices) .109
Conservation easements, however, may be particularly 
ill-suited to a changing world without undergoing some 
changes themselves . Generally, a conservation easement 
defines today’s use of the land and requires perpetuation 
of that use . Instead, conservation easements should adopt 
adaptive management principles and create mechanisms 
that allow for things that might sound radical, such as 
changing management provisions or even possibly mov-
ing protected areas to follow species migrations .110 In some 
cases, a simple change may be to convert perpetual con-
servation easements to term agreements that look more 
like conservation leases . This could allow conservation 
organizations to continually assess the conservation value 
of protecting the property and consider shifting levels of 
encumbrance on landowner activities .
In addition, land conservationists need to recognize not 
only that conservation easements are not the only tool pres-
ently in their tool box, but also that they need to work on 
adding tools to that kit . The current embrace and growth 
of conservation easements demonstrates the possibility 
for developing new public and private tools to meet com-
munity land-protection needs . Already, groups are experi-
menting with (and scholars are beginning to write about) 
using options differently, making payments for protection 
of ecosystem services, and exploring uses of endowments or 
annuities for land protection .111
Moreover, private contract- and payment-based tools 
will likely prove inadequate on their own . Regulatory pro-
hibitions on harmful activities are needed to meet goals of 
both mitigation and adaptation .112 For example, state legis-
latures and courts could begin by acknowledging the idea 
108 . See Alain Karsenty et al ., “Carbon Rights,” REDD+, and Payments for Envi-
ronmental Services, 35 Envtl . Sci . & Pol’y 20 (2014) .
109 . See Steven Ruddell et al ., The Role for Sustainably Managed Forests in Climate 
Change Mitigation, 105 J . Forestry 314 (2007); James L . Olmsted, Carbon 
Dieting: Latent Ancillary Rights to Carbon Offsets in Conservation Easements, 
29 J . Land Resources & Envtl . L . 121 (2009) .
110 . See Jesse J . Richardson Jr ., Conservation Easements and Adaptive Manage-
ment, 3 Sea Grant L . & Pol’y J . 31 (2010); Adena R . Rissman et al ., Con-
servation Easements: Biodiversity Protect and Private Use, 21 Conservation 
Biology 709 (2007) .
111 . See, e.g., Rissman et al ., supra note 106 .
112 . See W . Neil Adger et al ., Successful Adaptation to Climate Change Across 
Scales, 15 Global Envtl . Change 77 (2005); Richard J . Lazarus, Super 
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of rolling easements along coastlines where protected areas 
shift as sea levels rise, even if this will mean loss of private 
land .113 While the public trust doctrine protects these areas 
in theory, many governments are too nervous about poten-
tial constitutional Takings Clause claims to disrupt private 
property owners’ expectations (whether those expectations 
are reasonable or not) . Our culture is so busy worshipping 
at the altar of private property rights that we are likely to 
degrade, or even destroy, the very idol sitting before us .
XIII. Law Confronts the Intertwined Threats 
of Climate Change and Species 
Extinction
This section was authored by David Takacs, Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law.
We share the Earth with millions of gorgeous species, 
the current, ephemeral expressions of over 3 billion years 
of biological evolution . All species are cogs in function-
ing ecosystems that support all life . All humans require 
a diversity of species to feed, heal, and inspire us . With 
“high confidence,” Working Group III’s Summary for Pol-
icymakers asserts that “[a] large fraction of both terrestrial 
and freshwater species faces increased extinction risk under 
projected climate change during and beyond the 21st 
century, especially as climate change interacts with other 
stressors, such as habitat modification, over-exploitation, 
pollution, and invasive species .”114 The Summary further 
notes that “[m]any species will be unable to track suit-
able climates under mid- and high-range rates of climate 
change .”115 That is to say, continued evolution in the face 
of a most unnatural selection is unlikely for most species, 
and thus “[t]hose that cannot adapt sufficiently fast will go 
extinct in part or all of their ranges .”116
Temperatures will rise, droughts will exacerbate, storms 
will intensify, pests will spread, pollinators will go extinct 
or lose synchronicity with the plants they pollinate, and all 
the while, human populations will be expanding and on 
the move, exploiting more of the ecosystems upon which 
all human life depends . Through the alchemy of photo-
synthesis, terrestrial ecosystems absorb about one-quarter 
of human CO2 emissions; deforestation disrupts this vital 
ecosystem service and currently accounts for about 15-20% 
of GHG emissions . So, as climate change and human needs 
degrade natural ecosystems—as plants are felled, burned, 
or eaten; as tundra melts; as peat bogs desiccate—climate 
change worsens, further imperiling species and ecosystems .
Paying attention to the twinned threats of climate 
change and species extinction requires ingenuity, cash, 
and nimble legal mechanisms . Two novel solutions—
Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the 
Future, 94 Cornell L . Rev . 1153 (2009) .
113 . See So-Min Cheong, Policy Solutions in the U.S., 106 Climate Change 57, 
61-62 (2011) (describing rolling easements) .
114 . WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 14-15 .
115 . Id. at 15 .
116 . Id.
REDD+ and biodiversity offsetting—comprise potentially 
win-win solutions .
In REDD+, a local community, individual landowner, 
private developer, or government entity reforests degraded 
land or preserves a forest that would otherwise be felled . 
The actor may then sell the stored carbon for a contracted 
period of time to entities that want to offset their GHG 
emissions or simply want to preserve forests . REDD+ may 
happen on a project-by-project basis . Increasingly, however, 
it is operating on a broader scale: A nation, province, or 
state uses REDD+ funds to reduce deforestation or pro-
mote reforestation in a wide geographic area, resulting in 
greater stored carbon than would have occurred without 
the funding .
REDD+ blurs the bounds between global mitigation 
and local adaptation . REDD+ mitigates climate change 
when trees retain carbon that deforestation would other-
wise release, or if new growth absorbs extra CO2 . Healthy 
forests help communities adapt to climate change by sus-
taining ecosystem services—preventing erosion, increas-
ing rainfall, buffering floods, cleansing drinking water, 
and harboring crop pollinators—and by preserving bio-
diversity crucial for human survival . REDD+ investments 
can promote socioeconomic climate change adaptation 
through new sources of income and by providing for more 
secure, formal land title . REDD+ may also further institu-
tional adaptation as community leaders, landowners, and 
government officials develop and manage REDD+ proj-
ects and hone skills and institutions to negotiate effectively 
with project developers and government functionaries .
Biodiversity offsets, in turn, translate the logic of car-
bon offsetting into something more sweeping . In more 
than two dozen jurisdictions, developers are being allowed 
to destroy biodiversity in one place in exchange for pro-
tecting biodiversity elsewhere . They are trading life for 
life . As in REDD+, if biodiversity offsetting works as its 
backers promise, then it’s a win-win situation: Jurisdictions 
encourage economic development where it is needed and 
can prioritize preservation where it is most effective and 
beneficial to the species, ecosystems, and human commu-
nities of concern .
To fulfill their promise, biodiversity offsets must both 
mitigate the original damage and enhance the chance for 
a species to survive . But is life fungible? Let’s put aside for 
the moment the question of whether it is ethically legiti-
mate to harm one biological community (and perhaps 
harm the human communities that depend upon those 
communities) in exchange for biological mitigation else-
where . In the name of preservation of an imperiled species 
or ecosystem type, conservation biology may support off-
setting . Given climate change, isolated small preserves may 
allow species nowhere to go, and static management that 
does not respond to ecological change may result in local 
extinctions as well as global ones . Prioritizing fewer, larger 
reserves (as opposed to scattered, smaller ones) can help 
preserve greater genetic diversity (and thus a more resil-
ient species response to climate change) . Offsetting might 
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also prioritize corridors and connectivity to allow species to 
migrate to more suitable habitats .
The IPCC notes that governing a transition toward an 
effective climate response and sustainable development 
pathway is “a challenge involving rethinking our relation 
to nature, accounting for multiple generations and inter-
ests (including those based on endowments in natural 
resources), overlapping environmental issues, among actors 
with widely unequal capacities, resources, and political 
power, and divergent conceptions of justice .”117 REDD+ 
and biodiversity offsetting do not change existing societal 
patterns unless they are done in ways that are transforma-
tive: transferring large quantities of wealth from North 
to South; inventing nimble and flexible uses of land not 
subject to the strictures of private property or rigid gov-
ernmental control; fomenting true environmental democ-
racy as communities are empowered to formulate, manage, 
and reap economic and ecological benefits from REDD+ 
projects or biodiversity banks, and/or implemented with 
the most capacious possible interpretation of international 
human rights law .118
Whether they function effectively in the short term, or 
lead to genuine transformation in the long run, REDD+, 
biodiversity offsetting, or any other legal regime to preserve 
Earth’s myriad species and the humans that depend upon 
them, must be implemented sustainably and in a deeply 
equitable way . For REDD+ or biodiversity offsetting to be 
sustainable, it must be: (1) effective—working for all stake-
holders with minimal complication; (2) synergistic—maxi-
mizing benefits for climate, biodiversity, and local people; 
and (3) equitable—narrowing gaps between rich and poor . 
“Deep equity,” in turn, refers to the laws, policies, and val-
ues that promote sustainable pathways acting in synergy to 
maximize the health and potential of all individuals, com-
munities, and ecosystems . The equity is “deep” because val-
ues become rooted within each individual, requiring that 
we fundamentally reenvision our community structures and 
responsibilities and root these values and responsibilities in 
our legal systems . Our laws and policies would, in turn, sup-
port values and actions promoting even deeper equity .
Neither REDD+ nor biodiversity offsetting offers a 
permanent solution to the species extinction crisis . They 
are stopgap, emergency legal mechanisms that buy (liter-
ally) time for us to transition to a non-hydrocarbon-based 
economy and for the planet to heal and rebound from heat 
and chaos . Poorly designed REDD+ projects and biodi-
versity offsets may facilitate ecologically damaging human 
development, and may simply accelerate biodiversity loss 
in the face of climate change, undermining humans’ own 
options for adaptation and survival . If done well, however, 
they offer enhanced resilience for local human and non-
human communities in the present, bandages to staunch 
wounds while we find the moxie to address the underlying 
causes of species extinction .
117 . WGIII AR5, supra note 18, ch . 4 at 4 .
118 . For a list of articles on this topic, please visit Social Science Research Net-
work, David Takacs’ Scholarly Papers, http://ssrn .com/author=1393231 .
XIV. Addressing Climate Change Without 
Talking About Climate Change
This section was authored by Inara Scott, Assistant Professor, 
College of Business, Oregon State University.
Talking about climate change gets depressing fast . The 
AR5 does not help . Though the practical reality of the 
current situation is buried deep in scenarios, options, and 
complex modeling, the bottom line is that the current rate 
of emissions will bring global temperature increases in 
the range of 3 .7-4 .8°C by 2100,119 a scenario most agree 
would be “devastating” to human society .120 A “4°C world” 
will experience severe drought, species and habitat extinc-
tion, and risk worldwide tipping points with unpredictable 
future outcomes .121
Given this dramatic trajectory, why do only 34% of 
Americans worry “a great deal” about climate change?122 
One problem may be our cognitive hardwiring . As a spe-
cies, humans are not good at making long-term decisions 
and are particularly apt to choose short-term gains over 
long-term benefits . Also, studies suggest that activism is 
likely to be driven in part by feelings of efficacy—that is, 
the more hopeless and dire the situation appears, the less 
likely people will be to get involved in political advocacy .123 
Thus, our attempts to inspire activism by educating people 
about the enormity of the climate change problem may 
backfire by making people less likely to become involved 
in climate activism .
But what is the alternative? What do I suggest for those 
of us who are deeply concerned about the impacts of cli-
mate change, and want to inspire action toward both adap-
tation and mitigation? Absolutely not to ignore, turn back, 
or stop important research and outreach related to the 
causes and long-term impacts of climate change . However, 
as lawyers who are deeply attuned to the power of language 
and the art of persuasion, I believe we must recognize the 
harm we may be doing by leading our arguments with the 
devastating and irreversible effects of climate change, and 
consider when and where to emphasize positive and realis-
tic strategies for mitigation and adaptation .
The topic of national security provides an excellent 
backdrop for exploring this concept . Working Group II 
describes significant risks to human security from climate 
change, including displacement and migration caused by 
rising sea levels, loss of arable land, and drought .124 Con-
flicts over scarce resources, including food and water, can 
119 . WGIII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2 .
120 . Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al ., World Bank, Executive sum-
mary, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4 Degree Celsius Warmer World 
Must Be Avoided v (2014), http://documents .worldbank .org/curated/
en/2012/11/17485703/turn-down-heat-4-degree-celsius-warmer-world-
must-avoided-executive-summary .
121 . See id . at 1-2; WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 13 .
122 . Frank Newport, Americans Show Low Levels of Concern on Global Warming, 
Gallup, Apr . 14, 2014 http://www .gallup .com/poll/168236/americans-
show-low-levels-concern-global-warming .aspx .
123 . Connie Roser-Renouf et al ., The Genesis of Climate Change Activism: From 
Key Beliefs to Political Action, 125 Climatic Change 163 (2014) .
124 . See WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 20 .
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exacerbate conflicts between nations and increase instabil-
ity of governments . Climate change must be considered 
as a “threat multiplier,” which exacerbates existing con-
flicts and risks—including the radicalization of tensions 
between and among ethnic and religious groups and the 
spread of terrorism .125 It takes little imagination to con-
clude that a hot, arid, water-constrained planet, marked by 
warring ethnic and religious factions and unstable govern-
ments, threatens U .S . interests, both abroad and at home .
Yet, in the area of national security, there is much that 
can be done toward the twin goals of adaptation and miti-
gation that is practical and achievable . The U .S . military, 
the single largest energy consumer in the world,126 has a 
deeply rooted interest in minimizing its dependence on fos-
sil fuels . Meeting the fossil fuel needs of military operations 
requires constant resupply and fuel delivery, demanding 
huge amounts of financial and troop resources and put-
ting those working on supply chains at significant risk .127 
Technological innovation in the areas of energy efficiency, 
renewable resources, and alternative fuels could reduce 
military casualties, improve mobility, and minimize vul-
nerabilities to attack . It could also have profound impacts 
on global carbon emissions and, as a result, reduce the 
extent of global warming .128 Through congressional and 
presidential mandates, the U .S . Department of Defense is 
uniquely positioned among government agencies to invest 
in renewable energy and energy-efficiency technologies .129 
However, if the rhetoric for such efforts is based primarily 
on threats related to climate change, they are vulnerable to 
(at best) public apathy or (at worst) political stonewalling .130
Other political strategies related to improving national 
security also have the potential for significant climate 
change mitigation . For example, efforts to prevent defor-
estation in Indonesia through programs like REDD could 
help stabilize the fragile Indonesian government—a key 
U .S . security goal because of the country’s large Muslim 
population, which could become a threat if it were to 
125 . U .S . Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 8 (2014), 
available at http://www .defense .gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Re-
view .pdf; CNA Military Advisory Board, National Security and the 
Accelerating Risks of Climate Change 2 (2014), available at http://
www .cna .org/sites/default/files/MAB_2014 .pdf [hereinafter CNA Report] .
126 . Siddhartha M . Velandy, The Green Arms Race: Reorienting the Discussions on 
Climate Change, Energy Policy, and National Security, 3 Harv . Nat’l Sec . J . 
309, 323-28 (2012) .
127 . See id. at 324 .
128 . Limiting global warming will require significant reductions in fossil fuel 
consumption . Working Group III notes that scenarios limiting global tem-
perature increases to 2°C include “more rapid improvements in energy ef-
ficiency, a tripling to nearly a quadrupling of the share of zero- and low-car-
bon energy supply from renewables, [and] nuclear energy and fossil energy 
with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) or bioenergy with CCS .” 
WGIII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 13 .
129 . For a thorough discussion of the complex relationship between the military 
and the environment, and the potential for the military to drive innovation 
in the energy industry, see Sarah E . Light, The Military-Environmental Com-
plex, 55 B .C . L . Rev . 879, 907-14 (2014) .
130 . Climate Science Watch, House Votes to Direct the Pentagon to Disregard 
Climate Change Assessments, June 24, 2014, at http://www .climatescience-
watch .org/2014/06/24/house-votes-to-direct-the-pentagon-to-disregard-
climate-change-assessments/ .
become radicalized .131 At home, a number of major military 
installations, including Naval Station Norfolk, are in areas 
threatened by rising sea levels and storms, which threaten 
both the military bases and the surrounding communi-
ties .132 Adaptation to these conditions may require modi-
fication of roads, bridges, water systems, and both public 
and private infrastructure .133 While the long-term impact 
of climate change is clearly relevant in both cases, “4°C 
world” scenarios are not necessary to prove the importance 
and benefit of taking such measures .
The problem of climate change requires a multifaceted 
approach . The area of national security provides fertile 
ground for mitigation and adaptation efforts that improve 
U .S . security and address current vulnerabilities, while 
also offering significant co-benefits in the fight against 
global warming . The key to achieving those benefits may 
lie in an emphasis on practical, achievable, and positive 
steps to change .
XV. Agnostic Adaptation
This section was authored by Katrina Fischer Kuh, Profes-
sor of Law, Associate Dean for Intellectual Life and Hofstra 
Research Fellow, Maurice A. Deane School of Law.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers makes 
the following empirical claims:
Adaptation planning and implementation at all levels of 
governance are contingent on societal values, objectives, 
and risk perceptions (high confidence) . Recognition of 
diverse interests, circumstances, social-cultural contexts, 
and expectations can benefit decision-making processes . 
Indigenous, local, and traditional knowledge systems and 
practices, including indigenous peoples’ holistic view of 
community and environment, are a major resource for 
adapting to climate change, but these have not been used 
consistently in existing adaptation efforts . Integrating 
such forms of knowledge with existing practices increases 
the effectiveness of adaptation .
Decision support is most effective when it is sensitive 
to context and the diversity of decision types, deci-
sion processes, and constituencies (robust evidence, high 
agreement) . Organizations bridging science and decision 
making, including climate services, play an important 
role in the communication, transfer, and development 
of climate-related knowledge, including translation, 
engagement, and knowledge exchange (medium evi-
dence, high agreement) .134
Agnostic adaptation means adaptation without the 
why—the divorce of adaptation from knowledge or accep-
tance of climate change being humans’ fault . Adaptation is 
131 . See Joshua W . Busby, Council on Foreign Relations, Climate 
Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action, CFR No . 
32, at 20-21 (2007), available at http://www .cfr .org/climate-change/
climate-change-national-security/p14862 .
132 . See CNA Report, supra note 125, at 25 .
133 . See id .
134 . WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 26 .
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agnostic when one prepares for or responds to an actual or 
projected climate change-induced impact (for example, by 
planting a drought-resistant crop) without acknowledging 
that the adaptation is probabilistically or in fact necessar-
ily because of anthropogenic climate change (that drought 
conditions are caused or exacerbated by humans’ emissions 
of CO2 and other GHGs) .
At the individual level, agnostic adaptation is natural 
and ubiquitous . When it is uncomfortably hot, people turn 
on air conditioners, flee to the beach, and visit local park 
sprinklers . Similarly, they gradually and logically update 
the stock of boots, umbrellas, and coats in their clos-
ets to match the weather they have become accustomed 
to experiencing, most often with nary a thought of cli-
mate change . Considering how adaptation policy should 
approach agnostic adaptation is, however, more difficult . 
Should our domestic adaptation policy connect adaptation 
to anthropocentric climate change? Should it tolerate, or 
even facilitate, agnostic adaptation?
Numerous government policies or programs are pur-
posefully oriented toward preparing for or adjusting to 
climate change impacts . For example, executive orders 
direct federal agencies to promote adaptation in various 
ways, including by preparing agency adaptation plans .135 
The U .S . Department of Agriculture (USDA) Farm Ser-
vice Agency (FSA) Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 
includes the following:
Action 2: FSA will partner with the REE mission area, as 
well as NGOs, to publicize and/or make available decision 
support tools at field offices, facilitating their outreach . An 
example of such a tool to encourage use of seasonal cli-
mate information in farm management decisions is Agro-
climate, a project of the Southeast Climate Consortium 
(Agroclimate 2011) .136
The AgroClimate website provides detailed informa-
tion to help farmers better manage climate risks, including 
those associated with climate change, and features climate 
risk analyses, drought indices, and a cooling/heating degree 
days calculator .137 Although there are a few references to 
climate change on the website, it is a fair characterization 
that the site does not emphasize the connection between 
135 . Exec . Order No . 13514, 74 Fed . Reg . 52117 (Oct . 8, 2009) . Agencies are 
also instructed to direct federal funding to support climate resilience and 
to design and implement “land- and water-related policies, programs, and 
regulations  .  .  . to make the Nation’s watersheds, natural resources, and eco-
systems, and the communities and economies that depend on them, more 
resilient in the face of a changing climate .” Exec . Order No . 13653, 78 Fed . 
Reg . 66819 (Nov . 6, 2013) .
136 . USDA Farm Service Agency Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 
39-40 (2012) .
137 . AgroClimate, Tools for Managing Climate Risk in Agriculture, http://agro-
climate .org/fact-sheets-climate .php (lasted visited July 25, 2014) . AgroCli-
mate is a product of the Southeast Climate Consortium, a coalition of six 
universities funded in part by governmental agencies and programs with the 
mission “to use advances in climate sciences, including improved capabili-
ties to forecast seasonal climate and long-term climate change, to provide 
scientifically sound information and decision support tools for agricultural 
ecosystems, forests and other terrestrial ecosystems, and coastal ecosystems 
of the Southeastern USA .” Southeast Climate Consortium, Mission, http://
www .seclimate .org/mission .php (last visited July 25, 2014) .
anthropogenic causes and the climate change adaptation 
measures that it advances .138 This, then, appears to provide 
an example of how adaptation policy may tolerate, if not 
facilitate, agnostic adaptation in some contexts .
The example chosen here, involving the communica-
tion of adaptation strategies to farmers in the Southeast, 
provides a good illustration of possible rationales for 
incorporating agnostic adaptation into adaptation policy . 
Many in the United States reject anthropogenic climate 
change139; perhaps agnostic adaptation outreach will make 
such individuals more receptive to taking adaptive mea-
sures . Perhaps, farmers in the Southeast are more likely 
to use and trust an agricultural adaptation website that 
downplays anthropogenic climate change, thereby render-
ing the agnostic adaptation policy more effective .140 And 
because the benefits of effective adaptation accrue locally 
and to individuals, there is ample incentive for individu-
als and communities to adapt regardless of their beliefs 
about why there is a need to adapt . Additionally, predic-
tions about the impacts of climate change are uncertain, 
particularly at the local level . Another possible benefit of 
agnostic adaptation policy is that it may relieve the burden 
of ascertaining and communicating connections between 
anthropogenic climate change and specific on-the-ground 
impacts, thereby conserving resources for direct adapta-
tion measures .
However, agnostic adaptation policy also raises concerns . 
Excising anthropogenic climate change information from 
adaptation outreach, or simply downplaying the connec-
tion between the need to adapt and anthropogenic climate 
change, may undermine mitigation efforts by obscuring 
a potentially powerful rationale for mitigation policy: the 
fact that climate change will threaten the individuals who 
138 . A paper that can be downloaded from the site discusses rainfall intensity . 
A section titled Climate Change Projections states: “Warmer air can hold 
more water vapor, and if temperatures continue to rise, the projections of 
future climate suggest there will be continued increases in high-intensity 
rain events .” Southeast Climate Extension, Rainfall Intensity Changes in the 
Southeastern U.S. In a paper titled Climate Trends in the Southeast: Tem-
perature, a section on Causes of Changes in Temperature states: “Most sci-
entists believe that these increases in temperature are due to increases in 
greenhouse gases, which trap heat near the surface of the earth rather than 
releasing it back into space .” The site also offers a carbon footprint calculator 
tool indexed to different crops .
139 . Gallup Politics, One in Four in U.S. Are Solidly Skeptical of Global Warm-
ing (Apr . 22, 2014) (presenting the results of detailed polling of American 
regarding attitudes toward and beliefs about climate change), http://www .
gallup .com/poll/168620/one-four-solidly-skeptical-global-warming .aspx 
(last visited July 27, 2014) .
140 . In a similar fashion, in the mitigation context, a kind of veiled mitigation 
strategy divorces actions to reduce GHG emissions from climate mitigation 
by suggesting that individuals be encouraged to reduce energy use or take 
other measures that will reduce emissions for reasons other than avoiding 
climate change, such as energy independence or thrift . See Roger A . Pielke 
Jr ., The Case for a Sustainable Climate Policy: Why Costs and Benefits Must Be 
Temporally Balanced, 155 U . Pa . L . Rev . 1843, 1850 (2007)
Ultimately, motivating local action to mitigate global climate 
change calls for an indirect strategy, focused on the ways in which 
emissions-producing activities are embedded in broader commu-
nity concerns . The primary benefit of an indirect approach is that 
it avoids many of the political debates about climate change science 
that have plagued international efforts to address this issue .
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are the subject of adaptation outreach .141 Ultimately, miti-
gation is a necessary part of successful adaptation because 
our capacity to adapt could be overwhelmed . The question 
thus becomes whether agnostic adaptation policy is bet-
ter at promoting adaptation in the long run . This analysis 
would require weighing any short-term benefit from more 
effectively spurring adaptive behaviors in skeptical com-
munities against any longer term influence on the pace and 
scale of mitigation .
As a practical matter, agnostic adaptation outreach 
may make it more difficult to structure adaptation pol-
icy to promote mitigation co-benefits (decrease emis-
sions) and avoid adverse mitigation side effects (increase 
emissions) .142 It is hard to promote or discourage an 
adaptive measure in part because it reduces or produces 
emissions without first acknowledging that emissions 
contribute to climate change . Agnostic adaptation pol-
icy is also somewhat unpalatable from the perspective 
of international climate justice . Some of the most com-
141 . Cara Pike, Adaptation Communications: An Overview of the Re-
search and Practice (2013), http://epa .gov/statelocalclimate/documents/
pdf/2-adaptation-communications-overview-3-21 .pdf (observing that edu-
cation about climate impacts can increase interest in mitigation and that 
“[u]nderstanding of adaptation can lead to heightened interest in mitigation 
but more on the ground examples are needed .”) .
142 . For a discussion of the need for and benefits of holistic climate change gov-
ernance considering both mitigation and adaptation, see Katherine Triso-
lini, Holistic Climate Change Governance: Towards Mitigation and Adaptation 
Synthesis, 85 U . Colo . L . Rev . 615 (2014) .
pelling normative claims for the United States to con-
tribute to international adaptation or mitigation efforts 
rest upon recognition of anthropocentric climate change 
and the historic and present U .S . contribution of GHG 
emissions . Agnostic adaptation may enhance our already 
superior domestic adaptation capacity in a manner that 
handicaps the development of public and political sup-
port for international adaptation assistance .
Ultimately, evaluating agnostic adaptation policy 
requires resolution of a series of empirical questions that 
are better-suited to resolution by the social and communi-
cation sciences . For example, will adaptation outreach be 
more effective if it does not attribute the need for adapta-
tion to climate change and/or attribute climate change to 
human causes, and what effect does coupling adaptation 
outreach with information about anthropogenic climate 
change have on attitudes toward mitigation?143 We should, 
however, take care to understand the answers to these 
questions when contemplating agnostic adaptation policy .
143 . The site Climate Access compiles research into climate change commu-
nication, including with respect to adaptation outreach . Climate Access, 
Resource Hub, http://www .climateaccess .org/resource-hub . An interesting 
study is Amanda Carrico et al ., Does Learning About Climate Change Adap-
tation Change Support for Mitigation?, 41 J . Envtl . Psych . 19 (2014) .
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